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I. INTRODUCTION 
Conflicts of interest pose recurring professional responsibility and 
practice management challenges for lawyers and are a persistent source of 
professional liability exposure.  Conflicts of interest may spawn breach of 
fiduciary duty and professional negligence allegations, require lawyers to 
decline potentially lucrative representations, disqualify lawyers from 
representations or force their withdrawal from cases, compel law firms to 
disgorge fees, bruise lawyers’ relationships with clients, and generate 
negative publicity that may at least temporarily harm law firms’ 
reputations.  Predictably, then, law firm general counsels rank conflicts of 
interest among their top risk management concerns.1 
At the same time, law firm general counsels understandably cite 
conflicts as the one area in which lawyers require the most education.2  
Conflicts of interest are often complicated.  There are some bright line 
rules, such as a lawyer’s inability to represent both the plaintiff and the 
defendant in the same case, but many answers to conflicts questions are 
unclear.  Who is the client?  What is direct adversity?  When do lawyers’ 
relationships with current clients, former clients, or third parties create a 
substantial risk of material limitations in proposed concurrent 
representations?  When does a client’s consent to a conflict of interest 
qualify as informed?  In the case of former client conflicts, when are 
successive matters substantially related?  The list of questions goes on. 
Although conflicts of interest arise in all practice areas, they seem to 
pervade environmental matters.3  Experienced environmental lawyers 
                                                          
*  Managing Director, Aon, Kansas City, Missouri.  J.D., University of Kansas.  Opinions expressed 
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 1. Matthew K. Corbin, The Aon General Counsel Survey, QUALITY ASSURANCE REV. (Aon plc, 
Chi., Ill.), Summer 2016, at 1, 20–21 (ranking conflicts of interest as one of law firm general counsels’ 
top three risk management concerns) (on file with the author).  
 2. Id. at 20–21. 
 3. IRMA S. RUSSELL, ISSUES OF LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 199 
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assert that “environmental law poses especially difficult and complex” 
conflict questions.4  There are several reasons for this claim.  First, “[t]he 
complexity and size of a typical environmental proceeding combined with 
a relatively small number of qualified [law] firms increases the likelihood 
of a conflict of interest.”5  For example, the federal Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, or CERCLA, 
establishes a liability regime for the remediation of hazardous waste 
facilities (often named as Superfund sites) under which scores of 
potentially responsible parties (PRPs) identified in a cost recovery action 
initiated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may have 
competing interests.6  For a law firm with a significant environmental law 
practice, any Superfund case is reasonably likely to involve more than one 
of its existing clients as a PRP or to draw requests for representation from 
multiple PRPs who would become new clients, or both, and all of whom 
may at some point be adverse to one another. 
Second, and relatedly, multiple PRPs may form joint defense groups 
or similar alliances that employ common counsel, or which share 
confidential information among separately represented members, or both.  
A lawyer’s employment as group counsel or receipt of confidential 
information from a party in one matter may create conflicts of interest in 
subsequent matters that are substantially related to the first one.7  Indeed, 
allegations of former client conflicts of interest under Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.9(a)8 and state counterparts regularly appear on the 
environmental law landscape.9 
                                                          
(2003). 
 4. Andrew Kenefick et al., Assessing Conflicts of Interest at Multi-Party Superfund Sites: From 
First Involvement to Litigation, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 721, 725 (1998).  
 5. Sanford M. Stein & Jan M. Geht, Legal Ethics for Environmental Lawyers: Real Problems, 
New Challenges, and Old Values, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 729, 731 (2002). 
 6.  Kenefick et al., supra note 4, at 725 (stating that CERCLA and “state counterparts establish 
liability schemes whereby theoretically dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of parties can be adverse 
to every other party” (footnote omitted)); Stein & Geht, supra note 5, at 731 (discussing CERCLA 
cases as breeding grounds for conflicts of interest and stating that the number of PRPs may “reach 
well into the hundreds,” such that “[t]he greater number of PRPs increases the likelihood that a single 
firm would represent several parties” (footnote omitted)).   
 7. See, e.g., City of Kalamazoo v. Mich. Disposal Serv. Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 219, 231–43 
(W.D. Mich. 2000) (disqualifying a law firm that served as common counsel for a joint defense group 
and received confidential information from group members); GTE N., Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 
F. Supp. 1575, 1579–81 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (disqualifying a lawyer and his law firm based on an implied 
attorney-client relationship created during a joint pre-suit investigation).   
 8. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“A lawyer who has 
formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a 
substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of 
the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”).   
 9. RUSSELL, supra note 3, at 245. 
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Third, because in some areas environmental law expertise is 
concentrated in a few lawyers or law firms, a lawyer who advised a client 
in connection with a matter may later find herself materially adverse to 
that client on behalf of a second client in what is alleged to be a 
substantially related matter.  Sometimes the conflict may be a product of 
the lawyer moving laterally between law firms.  Regardless, if the two 
matters are, in fact, substantially related, the lawyer and her law firm will 
be guilty of a former client conflict of interest and in many cases be 
disqualified from participating in the second matter.10 
This Article explores common conflicts of interest in environmental 
law practice.  Part II addresses the first step in any conflict of interest 
analysis—identifying and classifying the clients.  In doing so, it discusses 
the general rules for establishing and terminating attorney-client 
relationships.  Part III examines concurrent client conflict of interest 
issues.  These include direct adversity conflicts, material limitation 
conflicts, conflicts of interest arising out of Superfund litigation, obtaining 
clients’ informed consent to conflicts of interest, and the enforceability of 
advance conflict waivers.  Part IV explores fundamental former client 
conflict of interest issues, focusing on the substantial relationship test for 
former client conflicts under Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(a).11  
Part IV also analyzes former client conflicts linked to lawyers’ lateral 
movement, including imputed disqualification and screening issues, and 
the meaning of “material adversity” for former client conflict purposes.  
Finally, Part V analyzes issue or positional conflicts of interest. 
                                                          
 10. See, e.g., Lane v. BP p.l.c., No. 15-CV-524-TCK-FHM, 2018 WL 4932002, at *4–6 (N.D. 
Okla. Oct. 11, 2018) (involving a lawyer who acquired confidential client information and 
subsequently moved laterally, and rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the defendant waived the 
former client conflict by waiting more than one year before moving to disqualify the lawyer); 
Roosevelt Irrigation Dist. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 810 F. Supp. 2d 
929, 945–75 (D. Ariz. 2011) (disqualifying the law firm in CERCLA litigation because of the lawyers’ 
prior representations of two PRPs in connection with groundwater contamination allegedly emanating 
from their properties); Stimson Lumber Co. v. Int’l Paper Co., No. CV 10-79-M, 2011 WL 124303, 
at *2–5 (D. Mont. Jan. 14, 2011) (involving a lawyer who moved laterally and his new firm’s 
ineffective attempt to screen him from participation in a private cost recovery action, resulting in the 
law firm’s disqualification); Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ablemarle Corp., No. 1:01-CV-890, 2004 WL 
7332836, at *6–9 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2004) (focusing on the client’s confidential information revealed 
to the lawyer in the prior representation).  But see New York v. Monfort Tr., No. CV 12–
3755(LDW)(SIL), 2014 WL 5018607, at *3–6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2014) (discussing New York ethics 
rules in connection with a CERCLA case and declining to disqualify the lawyer because the lawyer’s 
conflict did not taint the proceedings). 
 11. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
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II. IDENTIFYING AND CLASSIFYING CLIENTS 
The essential first step in any conflict of interest analysis is to know 
who the lawyer represents.  It is, after all, clients to whom lawyers owe 
duties of confidentiality and loyalty, which underpin conflict of interest 
rules.12  In most cases, client identities are clear.  The existence of an 
attorney-client relationship, or a person’s or entity’s status as a current or 
former client, can be answered by reviewing the terms of the lawyer’s 
engagement (or disengagement) letter.13  But not all cases are so 
straightforward.  Indeed, an attorney-client relationship may arise in the 
absence of an express contract between the lawyer and the client.14 
State substantive law, rather than rules of professional conduct, 
typically governs whether parties have an attorney-client relationship.15  
The existence of an attorney-client relationship, or conversely, the absence 
                                                          
 12. See Dynamic 3D Geosols. LLC v. Schlumberger Ltd., 837 F.3d 1280, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(“[T]here is an overriding countervailing concern suffusing the ethical rules: a client’s entitlement to 
an attorney’s adherence to her duty of loyalty, encompassing a duty of confidentiality. . . .  
Accordingly, the obligation to protect a client’s confidential information exists as part of the larger 
duty of loyalty owed to clients to maintain the integrity of the attorney-client relationship.” (citations 
omitted)); Antelope Valley—E. Kern Water Agency v. L.A. Cty. Waterworks Dist. No. 40 (Antelope 
Valley Groundwater Cases), 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 692, 702 (Ct. App. 2018) (“The restrictions on an 
attorney’s ability to represent clients with interests that are potentially or actually adverse are designed 
to protect two distinct values: to assure the attorney represents his or her client with undivided 
loyalties, and to assure the attorney will preserve confidential information conveyed by the client to 
the attorney.” (citations omitted)); N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. G.S., 149 A.3d 816, 831 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016) (“The risk in representing clients with conflicting interests is that a 
lawyer’s divided loyalty will result in less vigorous representation of both clients, and that the lawyer 
will use confidences of one client to benefit the other.” (citation omitted)); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & 
JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY § 1.7-1, at 361 (2018–2019) (“The rules governing conflicts of interest derive, in 
large part, from the need to protect client confidences and secrets and the need to assure clients that 
they have their lawyer’s loyalty.” (footnote omitted)).  A concurrent conflict of interest is one in which 
“the interests of two current clients are at odds,” while a former client conflict places a lawyer’s former 
client’s interests at odds with those of a current client.  Lennar Mare Island, LLC v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 
105 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1108 (E.D. Cal. 2015).  In a concurrent client conflict, it is principally the 
lawyer’s duty of loyalty—and the clients’ expectation of loyalty—that are at stake.  Id. (quoting Robert 
Bosch Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Cardiocom, LLC, No. C-14-1575, 2014 WL 2703807, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
June 13, 2014)).  In a former client conflict—where the lawyer’s representations are successive rather 
than concurrent—courts are chiefly concerned about preserving the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality 
to the former client.  Id.  “Nevertheless, the duty of confidentiality and loyalty apply in both concurrent 
and successive cases.”  Id.  
 13. See, e.g., Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elecs., 491 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1004 (W.D. Wash. 
2007) (deciding whether an attorney-client relationship exists should ordinarily begin with a review 
of the engagement agreement because its terms are accorded significant weight in examining the scope 
of the relationship). 
 14. Bistline v. Parker, 918 F.3d 849, 864 (10th Cir. 2019) (applying Utah law). 
 15. United States v. Williams, 720 F.3d 674, 686 (8th Cir. 2013); Rozmus v. West, 13 Vet. App. 
386, 387 (2000).   
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of one, depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.16  That said, 
some guidelines concerning the creation and termination of an attorney-
client relationship are useful to the overall client identity analysis. 
A. Establishing an Attorney-Client Relationship 
An attorney-client relationship may be expressly created through a 
written or oral contract.17  The execution of an engagement agreement or 
the payment of legal fees is significant when determining whether an 
attorney-client relationship exists.18  At the same time, these formalities 
are not essential because an attorney-client relationship may be implied or 
inferred from the parties’ conduct.19  Certainly, the payment of fees does 
not alone create an attorney-client relationship.20 
When deciding whether an implied attorney-client relationship exists, 
courts focus on the would-be client’s expectations and especially the 
reasonableness of the person’s “belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that 
capacity and his manifested intention to seek professional legal advice.”21  
Even applying this seemingly generous standard, however, a putative 
client’s unilateral belief that an attorney-client relationship exists is 
insufficient to establish such a relationship.22  Rather, a putative client’s 
subjective expectation that an attorney-client relationship has been formed 
must be accompanied by facts indicating that the person’s belief is 
                                                          
 16. In re Robbins, 192 A.3d 558, 563 (D.C. 2018); Valliere v. Fla. Elections Comm’n, 989 So. 
2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Newsome v. Peoples Bancshares, 269 So. 3d 19, 31 (Miss. 
2018); Rice v. Neether, 888 N.W.2d 749, 755 (N.D. 2016). 
 17. See, e.g., Cleveland Campers, Inc. v. R. Thad McCormack, P.C., 635 S.E.2d 274, 276 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2006)  (noting that “an attorney-client relationship generally is a matter of express contract”); 
Walker v. Elkin, 758 N.E.2d 972, 974–75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that the lawyer entered into 
an oral contract to represent the plaintiff’s son); State ex rel. Stivrins v. Flowers, 729 N.W.2d 311, 317 
(Neb. 2007) (reasoning that an attorney-client relationship existed where the client asked the lawyer 
to represent him at a deposition and the lawyer agreed to do so).  
 18. Avocent Redmond Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d at 1004; Mays v. Askin, 585 S.E.2d 735, 737 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2003); Patel v. Martin, 111 N.E.3d 1082, 1095 (Mass. 2018). 
 19. Stewart v. McDonald, 815 S.E.2d 665, 671–72 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Cleveland 
Campers, Inc., 635 S.E.2d at 276); In re Hodge, 407 P.3d 613, 648 (Kan. 2017); Patel, 111 N.E.3d at 
1093. 
 20. Edward Wildman Palmer LLP v. Supererior Court, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 620, 628 (Ct. App. 
2014); Rubin & Norris, LLC v. Panzarella, 51 N.E.3d 879, 891 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016); State ex rel. 
Stovall v. Meneley, 22 P.3d 124, 140 (Kan. 2001); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Brooke, 821 
A.2d 414, 424 (Md. 2003); Fuller v. Partee, 540 S.W.3d 864, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Fox 
v. White, 215 S.W.3d 257, 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)); In re Disciplinary Action Against Ward, 881 
N.W.2d 226, 229–30 (N.D. 2016). 
 21. Diversified Grp., Inc. v. Daugerdas, 139 F. Supp. 2d 445, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978)).  
 22. In re Rescue Concepts, Inc., 556 S.W.3d 331, 339 (Tex. App. 2017). 
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objectively reasonable.23  At base, then, the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship is measured by an objective standard.24 
By requiring evidence establishing the reasonableness of the aspiring 
client’s subjective belief that an attorney-client relationship exists—that 
is, by overlaying an objective standard—courts ensure that an attorney-
client relationship arises only when both the attorney and client consent to 
its formation.25  For example, a person’s subjective belief may be deemed 
reasonable where the surrounding facts and circumstances place the 
lawyer on notice that the person intended to form an attorney-client 
relationship, indicate that the lawyer shared the person’s subjective intent 
to create the relationship, or demonstrate that the lawyer acted in a manner 
that would prompt a reasonable person in the putative client’s position to 
rely on the lawyer’s professional advice.26  Similarly, if a lawyer holds 
herself out to third parties as representing a person, or acts on behalf of 
that person, these steps may evidence an attorney-client relationship.27 
Evraz Inc., N.A. v. Continental Insurance Co.28 is a relatively recent 
case arising out of Superfund litigation in which the court declined to 
recognize an attorney-client relationship.  The plaintiff, Evraz, was locked 
in a contract dispute with several insurance companies over their alleged 
breach of their duty to defend it in the so-called Portland Harbor Superfund 
litigation.29  Evraz sought leave to replace its law firm  in the breach of 
                                                          
 23. Hinerman v. Grill on Twenty First, LLC, 112 N.E.3d 1273, 1275–76 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018); 
Jensen v. Hillsboro Law Grp., PC, 403 P.3d 455, 461 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).  See, e.g., E.P. v. Hogreve, 
259 So. 3d 1007, 1011 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (explaining that the plaintiffs had “alleged sufficient 
facts to demonstrate their reasonable belief that they were consulting with [the lawyer] to obtain legal 
advice,” such that they shared an attorney-client relationship).  
 24. Barkerding v. Whittaker, 263 So. 3d 1170, 1182 (La. Ct. App. 2018). 
 25. See Cohen v. Jaffe Raitt Heuer & Weiss, P.C., 768 F. App’x 440, 444 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(recognizing that “attorney-client relationships require mutual assent. . . .  [O]ne party alone cannot 
create an attorney-client relationship”); People v. Shepherd, 99 N.E.3d 513, 518 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) 
(“Although an attorney-client relationship requires no formal written agreement or payment . . . both 
the attorney and the client must express their intent to form it.  The relationship is voluntary and 
contractual; it requires both parties’ consent.” (citations omitted)); In re Kinney, 670 N.E.2d 1294, 
1297 (Ind. 1996) (“The [attorney-client] relationship is consensual, existing only after both attorney 
and client have consented to its formation.” (citations omitted)). 
 26. DG Cogen Partners, LLC v. Lane Powell PC, 917 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1137 (D. Or. 2013) 
(quoting In re Conduct of Weidner, 801 P.2d 828, 837 (Or. 1990)). 
 27. See, e.g., In re Persaud, 467 B.R. 26, 40 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining that regular 
communications relating to the subject of the representation as well as activity by the lawyer and the 
client in furthering the objectives of the representation are pertinent to the analysis); Heine v. Colton, 
Hartnick, Yamin & Sheresky, 786 F. Supp. 360, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that a lawyer creates a 
presumption of an attorney-client relationship by entering an appearance in a proceeding); Davis v. 
State Bar, 655 P.2d 1276, 1278–79 (Cal. 1983) (mailing letters to third-parties in which the lawyer 
claimed that he represented the client evidenced an attorney-client relationship). 
 28. No. 3:08-cv-00447-AC, 2013 WL 6174839 (D. Or. Nov. 21, 2013). 
 29. Id. at *1. 
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contract case against the insurers, Gorden Tilden Thomas & Cordell LLP, 
with Stoel Rives LLP.30  Defendant Continental Insurance Co. 
(Continental) opposed Evraz’s motion in part because it allegedly would 
create a conflict of interest.31  In a nutshell, Continental claimed that 
because Stoel Rives was defending Evraz in the Portland Harbor 
Superfund litigation and Continental was reimbursing Evraz for the cost 
of that defense, Continental and Stoel Rives shared an attorney-client 
relationship.32  Therefore, Stoel Rives could not represent Evraz against it 
in the litigation at hand.33 
During the Portland Harbor Superfund litigation, the lead lawyer for 
Stoel Rives repeatedly advised Continental that the firm considered Evraz 
to be its client and that the firm was acting solely on Evraz’s behalf.34  In 
the breach of contract case, Evraz contended that under Oregon law, Stoel 
Rives and Continental never formed an attorney-client relationship and 
thus there could be no conflict of interest that would prohibit it from 
employing Stoel Rives in its lawsuit with Continental.35  To the contrary, 
Continental argued, there was “a default rule in Oregon that govern[ed] 
insurance duty-to-defend cases, and under this rule an attorney-client 
relationship automatically arose between Continental and Stoel Rives 
when Continental began ‘funding’ Evraz’s defense.”36 
The Evraz court observed that in a case styled In re Weidner,37 the 
Oregon Supreme Court held that an attorney-client relationship can be 
implied where (1) the aspiring client subjectively believes an attorney-
client relationship exists; and (2) that belief is objectively reasonable.38  As 
the Evraz court viewed the evidence, Continental failed both prongs of the 
In re Weidner test for an implied attorney-client relationship with Stoel 
Rives.39 
First, there was no evidence to support Continental’s claimed 
subjective belief that it shared an attorney-client relationship with Stoel 
Rives.40  Stoel Rives repeatedly told Continental that it represented Evraz 
alone in the Portland Harbor Superfund litigation and Continental never 
                                                          
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at *2, *4. 
 33. Id. at *1. 
 34. Id. at *2. 
 35. Id. at *4. 
 36. Id.  
 37. 801 P.2d 828 (Or. 1990). 
 38. Evraz, 2013 WL 6174839, at *4 (citing In re Weidner, 801 P.2d at 837).  
 39. See id. at *5 (“Continental cannot satisfy the Weidner test on the record before this court.”). 
 40. Id. 
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disputed those assertions.41  Furthermore, Continental never acted as 
though it had a typical insurance defense relationship with Stoel Rives that 
might suggest an attorney-client relationship.42  For example, virtually all 
of Continental’s communications in the Portland Harbor Superfund 
litigation were with Evraz rather than Stoel Rives, including 
communications in which Continental challenged Stoel Rives’s hourly 
rates and billing practices; Continental reimbursed Evraz for Stoel Rives’s 
fees rather than paying Stoel Rives directly; and Continental and Stoel 
Rives did not communicate about the conduct or status of the defense of 
the Superfund case as might be expected in a normal insurance defense 
representation.43  Second, but along the same lines, there was no evidence 
that Continental’s claimed belief that Stoel Rives represented it was 
objectively reasonable: 
Continental produced no letter, memo, email, or other contemporaneous 
document from Stoel Rives that supports an objectively reasonable basis 
to conclude that Stoel Rives represented Continental.  It produced no 
document from it to Stoel Rives claiming, expressly or implicitly, to be 
Stoel Rives’s client, which Stoel Rives then should have corrected or 
refuted.  Continental has produced no evidence of requests or demands 
to Stoel Rives’ insisting on compliance with traditional insurance-
defense relationship hallmarks such as creating litigation budgets, 
providing direct, regular status updates, setting maximize [sic] amounts 
for hourly rates, or requiring authorization from Continental before 
engaging in various litigation tasks.  And, at the time Evraz tendered its 
defense to Continental, Stoel Rives had been representing Evraz in the 
Portland Harbor Superfund litigation for five years and Evraz generally 
since the early 1990s, an attorney-client relationship created without any 
involvement by or connection with Continental.44 
Ultimately, the court concluded that there was no reason to prohibit 
Stoel Rives from representing Evraz in its lawsuit against Continental.45  
The court accordingly granted Evraz’s motion to substitute counsel.46 
B. Terminating the Attorney-Client Relationship 
Once an attorney-client relationship is established, the lawyer cannot 
easily end it.  Lawyers may withdraw from representations only for good 
                                                          
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at *6. 
 45. Id. at *9. 
 46. Id. 
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reason and, at least insofar as litigation is concerned, upon reasonable 
notice.47  Moreover, in litigation, the court must grant the lawyer’s motion 
to withdraw; until the court does so, the attorney-client relationship 
continues to the conclusion of the litigation.48  In contrast, a client may fire 
a lawyer at any time and for any reason, or for no reason.49 
Courts regularly assess the ways in which an attorney-client 
relationship may conclude.  The relationship clearly may terminate by the 
explicit statement of either the lawyer or the client.50  For example, a 
lawyer might specify in an engagement letter that her representation of the 
client will cease when she sends a final invoice for services or the lawyer 
might send a disengagement letter upon completion of the matter.  Overt 
acts inconsistent with the continuation of the attorney-client relationship 
may also terminate the relationship.  Examples of inconsistent conduct 
include the client filing a professional grievance against the lawyer, a 
client hiring another lawyer to perform the task for which the first lawyer 
was retained, or the client refusing to pay the lawyer’s bill.51 
Absent express statements or overt acts by either the lawyer or the 
client, an attorney-client relationship ends when circumstances imply that 
“it would be objectively unreasonable to continue to bind the parties to 
each other.”52  When determining the posture of the attorney-client 
                                                          
 47. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b) & (c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (listing 
grounds for permissive withdrawal and requiring a lawyer to comply with applicable law requiring 
notice to, or permission of, a tribunal when terminating a representation).  
 48. State v. Payne, 855 N.W.2d 783, 787 (Neb. 2014). 
 49. White Pearl Inversiones S.A. (Uruguay) v. Cemusa, Inc., 647 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2011); 
Nabi v. Sells, 892 N.Y.S.2d 41, 43 (App. Div. 2009); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16 cmt. 
4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 50. See Artromick Int’l, Inc. v. Drustar, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 226, 229 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (“Of course, 
the simplest way for either attorney or client to end the relationship is by expressly saying so.”); see, 
e.g., NuStar  Farms, LLC v. Zylstra, 880 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Iowa 2016) (recounting that the lawyer 
informed the clients by email “that he would no longer be representing them in any future matters” 
and that the clients acknowledged that they understood the email message to sever the attorney-client 
relationship); Rusk v. Harstad, 393 P.3d 341, 344 (Utah Ct. App. 2017) (concluding that a would-be 
client could not have reasonably believed that the law firm represented him where the lawyer had 
clearly stated in multiple emails that the law firm would not represent him). 
 51. See Artromick Int’l, Inc., 134 F.R.D. at 230–31 (ruling that the alleged client was a former 
client because he had refused to pay the attorney’s bill and thereafter retained other lawyers to work 
in areas which that attorney had previously performed); Waterbury Garment Corp. v. Strata Prods., 
554 F. Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (concluding that a person was a former client because the law 
firm represented him only in discrete transactions that had concluded and the person had subsequently 
retained different counsel); DeLeo v. Nusbaum, 821 A.2d 744, 750 (Conn. 2003) (“A de facto 
termination [of the attorney-client relationship] occurs if the client takes a step that unequivocally 
indicates that he has ceased relying on his attorney’s professional judgment in protecting his legal 
interests, such as hiring a second attorney to consider a possible malpractice claim or filing a grievance 
against the attorney.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 52. Artromick Int’l, Inc., 134 F.R.D. at 230. 
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relationship on an implied basis, the parties’ reasonable expectations often 
hinge on the scope of the lawyer’s representation.53  In that regard, the 
scope of a lawyer’s representation loosely falls into one of three 
categories: (1) the client hires the lawyer as general counsel with the 
expectation that the lawyer will handle all the client’s potential legal 
matters; (2) the client retains the lawyer to handle all matters that arise in 
a specific practice area, such as employment, litigation, real estate, or tax; 
(3) or the client engages the lawyer to represent the client in a discrete 
matter or matters.54  For all three categories, unless the client fires the 
lawyer or the lawyer withdraws from the representation, the attorney-
client relationship continues as long as the lawyer remains responsible for 
an open matter because the lawyer “has accepted responsibility for 
bringing the matter to a successful conclusion.”55  With respect to 
categories one and two, an attorney-client relationship exists even if the 
lawyer has no pending matter for the client because the client still 
reasonably expects that the lawyer will handle matters for the client as they 
arise.56  In the third category, where a lawyer agrees to undertake a specific 
matter on the client’s behalf, the attorney-client relationship typically ends 
once the matter is concluded.57 
III. CONCURRENT CLIENT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Once clients are identified and classified, it is time to examine 
potentially applicable rules of professional conduct.  Where current clients 
are concerned, conflicts of interest are governed by Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.7, which provides: 
                                                          
 53. Id. 
 54. Nat’l Med. Care, Inc. v. Home Med. of Am., Inc., No. 00-1225, 2002 WL 31068413, at *4 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 2002).   
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.; see also Berry v. McFarland, 278 P.3d 407, 411 (Idaho 2012) (explaining that if a lawyer 
agrees to handle any matters a client may have, the attorney-client relationship continues until either 
the lawyer or client terminates it); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2019) (“If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client 
sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer 
gives notice of withdrawal.”).  
 57.  Nat’l Med. Care, Inc., 2002 WL 31068413, at *4; Simpson v. James, 903 F.2d 372, 376 (5th 
Cir. 1990); DeLeo v. Nusbaum, 821 A.2d 744, 750 (Conn. 2003); Berry, 278 P.3d at 411; MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019); see also Revise Clothing, Inc. v. 
Joe’s Jeans Subsidiary, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 381, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that an attorney-client 
relationship is ordinarily terminated by the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was formed); 
Thayer v. Fuller & Henry Ltd., 503 F. Supp. 2d 887, 892 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (observing that an attorney-
client relationship may terminate “when the underlying action has concluded or when the attorney has 
exhausted all remedies in the case and had declined to provide additional legal services on related 
issues” (quoting Busacca v. Maguire & Schneider, LLP, 834 N.E.2d 856, 860 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005))). 
2019] UNDERSTANDING CONFLICTS 79 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a 
client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.  A 
concurrent conflict of interest exists if: 
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; 
or 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients 
will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, 
a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest 
under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide 
competent and diligent representation to each affected client; 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client 
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or 
other proceeding before a tribunal; and 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.58 
Conflicts of interest arising under Model Rule 1.7(a)(1) are generally 
characterized as “direct adversity” conflicts, while those arising under 
Model Rule 1.7(a)(2) are frequently described as “material limitation” 
conflicts. 
Whether clients are concurrent clients and therefore whether a conflict 
of interest should be evaluated under Model Rule 1.7 is determined at the 
time the alleged conflict arose.59  Were the approach otherwise, a lawyer 
could simply stop representing the less valuable or less desirable client and 
trigger the more lenient client conflict of interest test applied where a 
former client is concerned.60 
Importantly, the restrictions that Model Rule 1.7(a) imposes on 
                                                          
 58. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 59. First NBC Bank v. Murex, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 3d 38, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (involving a large 
law firm that in addition to representing the bank in this case concurrently represented the defendant 
in a threatened EPA enforcement action).  See, e.g., NuStar Farms, LLC v. Zylstra, 880 N.W.2d 478, 
484–85 (Iowa 2016) (finding that a direct adversity concurrent client conflict of interest existed 
because the lawyer formed the intent to pursue legal action against his clients before he terminated the 
attorney-client relationship). 
 60. First NBC Bank, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 68 (quoting Merck Eprova AG v. ProThera, 670 F. Supp. 
2d 201, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)); Markham Concepts, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 3d 345, 349 
(D.R.I. 2016). 
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individual lawyers generally apply equally to law firms.  This is because, 
with some exceptions, individual lawyers’ conflicts of interest are imputed 
to all other lawyers in the same firm.61 
A. Direct Adversity Conflicts 
As noted above, Model Rule 1.7(a)(1) first establishes that a lawyer 
has a conflict of interest when “the representation of one client will be 
directly adverse to another client.”62  The rule does not attempt to define 
“direct adversity” or to explain when concurrent representations are 
“directly adverse,” although the comments to Model Rule 1.7 offer 
examples.63  Some courts have attempted to define direct adversity, 
although they have not necessarily achieved clarity in doing so.  For 
example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has stated that direct 
adversity “involves a conflict between the legal rights and duties of 
clients.”64  In any event, Model Rule 1.7(a)(1)’s use of the adverb 
“directly” to modify “adverse” separates these conflicts from other 
conflicts premised upon clients’ general or indirect adversity.65  In 
addition, Rule 1.7(a)(1) only operates when concurrent clients’ interests 
“will be” directly adverse.66  This language excludes “the mere possibility 
of ‘directly adverse’ interests and inserts another factor of reasonable 
probability in the determination.”67 
                                                          
 61. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019); see also Ex parte 
Osbon, 888 So. 2d 1236, 1238 (Ala. 2004) (asserting that “Rule 1.10(a) requires a law firm to be 
treated as a single attorney”). 
 62. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 63. Id. r. 1.7 cmts. 6 & 7.   
 64. Bryan Corp. v. Abrano, 52 N.E.3d 95, 103 (Mass. 2016) (citing Maling v. Finnegan, 
Henderson, Farabow, Garrett, & Dunner, LLP, 42 N.E.3d 199, 204 (Mass. 2015)).   
 65. Chapman Eng’rs, Inc. v. Nat. Gas Sales Co., 766 F. Supp. 949, 956 (D. Kan. 1991) (citing 1 
GEOFFREY C.  HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.7:203 (1990)); Ill. 
State Bar Ass’n Prof’l Conduct, Adv. Op. 95-15, at 4 (1996), https://www.isba.org/sites/default/ 
files/ethicsopinions/95-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/BT26-6KBK] (interpreting the choice of the modifier 
“directly” to define adversity to “exclude indirect, derivative, and other speculative impacts of the 
lawyer’s activity” because otherwise “any conceivable impact on a client, however slight or 
implausible, would have to be taken as impermissible, direct adversity”).   
 66. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 67. Chapman Eng’rs, Inc., 766 F. Supp. at 956 (citing HAZARD & HODES, supra note 65, at 233)).  
See, e.g., Ramos v. Pabey, No. 2:05CV189-PS-PRC, 2005 WL 2240036, at *11 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 13, 
2005) (refusing to extend Rule 1.7(a) to a law firm soliciting city employees to bring civil rights 
lawsuits against the city while the firm represented the city because Rule 1.7(a) contemplates the 
concurrent conflicting representation of two clients); Guillen v. City of Chicago, 956 F. Supp. 1416, 
1426 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (listing cases for the proposition that “directly adverse” conflicts must be direct 
and concrete; the mere possibility of, or potential for, conflict is insufficient); In re James, 679 S.E.2d 
702, 709 (W. Va. 2009) (concluding that Rule 1.7 prohibition on direct adversity conflicts does not 
apply to a situation involving one current client and one potential client). 
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CenTra, Inc. v. Estrin68 is a direct adversity conflict case with an 
environmental law flavor.  It involved the Ambassador Bridge, which 
spans the Detroit River and connects Detroit, Michigan, with Windsor, 
Ontario.69  Two CenTra subsidiaries, the Detroit International Bridge Co. 
(DIBC) and its subsidiary, the Canadian Transit Co. (CTC), own and 
operate the bridge.70  Dan Stamper was the president of DIBC and CTC.71 
For over twenty years, CenTra was represented by one of Canada’s 
leading law firms, Gowling Lafleur Henderson, LLP (Gowlings).72  
During that same time, David Estrin, a partner in Gowlings’s Toronto 
office, periodically represented other clients in matters adverse to CenTra 
with Stamper’s knowledge and, apparently, with CenTra’s implied 
consent.73  In 2002, Estrin began representing the city of Windsor 
concerning the heavy traffic over the Ambassador Bridge.74  Although 
Estrin’s representation as initially scoped involved the bridge, it was not 
adverse to CenTra or its subsidiaries.75  Things turned adversarial, 
however, in the summer of 2004 when (1) CTC applied to Windsor for site 
plan approval to add more toll booths on the bridge and to expand the 
bridge deck; and (2) CTC applied to the U.S. Coast Guard to “twin” the 
Ambassador Bridge, that is, to build a second bridge beside the original.76  
CTC’s plan to twin the bridge became known as the “Bridge Plan.”77  
Estrin soon began representing Windsor in opposing CTC’s site plan and, 
in 2006, began representing Windsor in resisting the Bridge Plan.  In 
September 2006, for example, Estrin wrote to the Coast Guard to oppose 
the Bridge Plan.78  As a result, the Coast Guard demanded an 
environmental assessment from CenTra that cost the company around 
$800,000.79 
In the meantime, CenTra retained Gowlings to assist it in preparing a 
$700-800 million bond offering to finance the Bridge Plan.80  “Thus, by 
September 2006, Gowlings was simultaneously helping CenTra procure 
                                                          
 68. 538 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 69. Id. at 405–06. 
 70. Id. at 406. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 407. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. 
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funding for the bridge expansion and assisting Windsor in trying to halt 
the bridge expansion.”81  No one at Gowlings or CenTra initially spotted 
the conflict, nor could anyone decipher how it came to be.82 
CenTra eventually figured out that Gowlings was both friend and foe 
and sued the firm in a Michigan federal court for breach of contract, breach 
of fiduciary duty, and legal malpractice, all grounded in Gowlings’s 
concurrent conflict of interest.83  The district court awarded Gowlings 
summary judgment, holding that CenTra had impliedly consented to any 
conflict of interest.84  The district court found that CenTra had impliedly 
consented based on Stamper’s repeated engagement of Gowlings over the 
years to represent CenTra and its subsidiaries despite knowing that 
Gowlings had represented parties (including Windsor) that were adverse 
to CenTra in matters where CenTra was represented by other law firms.85  
CenTra appealed the district court’s decision to the Sixth Circuit.86 
In reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment, the Sixth 
Circuit observed that “[t]here are some conflicts of interest to which a 
client may not consent.”87  Unfortunately, in concluding that CenTra had 
impliedly consented to Gowlings’s conflict of interest, the district court 
“ignored the question of whether Gowlings’s simultaneous and adverse 
representation of CenTra and Windsor was in fact a conflict to which 
CenTra could consent.”88  The CenTra court held that there was a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Gowlings’s conflict of interest 
regarding the Bridge Plan was consentable.89  As the court explained: 
The Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct state that “[a] lawyer shall 
not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly 
adverse to another client, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other 
client; and (2) each client consents after consultation.” . . . This rule has 
particular salience when the attorney is representing both sides in the 
same conflict . . . . 
                                                          
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. at 407–08 (“Both CenTra and Gowlings claimed ignorance as to this conflict of 
interest.  According to Stamper: ‘I was not aware that Gowlings was representing Windsor in 
opposition to the Second Span until September, 2006, when I saw Mr. Estrin’s letter to the U.S. Coast 
Guard . . . opposing the Second Span.’ . . . Estrin claimed to be even more clueless[.]” (citations to the 
record omitted)). 
 83. Id. at 408. 
 84. Id. at 405, 409. 
 85. Id. at 409. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 412. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
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That CenTra and Windsor are not directly adverse . . . in a lawsuit is not 
determinative.  Without a doubt, the ethical concerns would be greater if 
Gowlings were representing both sides in the same lawsuit. . . .  
However . . . representing both sides of a matter that is not in litigation 
can make a conflict of interest nonconsentable if the differences between 
the wrangling parties are large enough. . . . 
The district court broadly stated that a client may consent to a conflict of 
interest; however, it is not true that all conflicts are consentable.  Whether 
a conflict is consentable depends upon the facts of the case.  According 
to the commentary to Michigan’s Rule 1.7, a conflict is nonconsentable 
“when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not 
agree to the representation under the circumstances.”  Given the 
evidence presented at the summary-judgment stage of this case, we hold 
that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Gowlings 
reasonably believed that the conflict would not adversely affect its 
relationship with its clients, and whether a disinterested lawyer would 
conclude that CenTra should agree to the representation.  CenTra 
submitted to the district court a declaration from an expert who stated 
that “I simply do not see how a law firm can offer sound professional 
service simultaneously to a client it is helping to build a bridge and to a 
client it is helping to block or delay construction of the bridge.  This is 
not even a close question.”  Thus, CenTra presented a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether this conflict was one to which it was capable 
of giving consent, and the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
was erroneous.90 
Even if the conflict was consentable, there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Gowlings adequately informed CenTra of the 
conflict to achieve consent.91  The Sixth Circuit concluded that CenTra’s 
knowledge of Estrin’s prior representations of parties adverse to CenTra 
in unrelated matters did not adequately inform CenTra about the nature of 
Gowlings’s conflict of interest regarding the Bridge Plan.92  As other 
courts had previously clarified, a lawyer cannot leave a client “to infer the 
full nature of a conflict from only bits and pieces of actual or constructive 
knowledge.”93 
Gowlings argued that the district court properly focused on CenTra’s 
awareness of a conflict of interest rather than flagging CenTra’s 
knowledge of Gowlings’s opposition to the Bridge Plan.94  “In other 
words, Gowlings contend[ed] that knowledge of earlier conflicts can 
constitute knowledge sufficient to consent to a different, subsequent 
                                                          
 90. Id. at 413–14 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 
 91. Id. at 414. 
 92. Id. at 415. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 416. 
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conflict.”95  The CenTra court disagreed, reasoning that “the ‘informed’ 
part of informed consent is tied to knowledge of the conflict in question, 
not different conflicts.”96  Indeed, if the general information that CenTra 
had regarding prior, unrelated conflicts of interest involving Gowlings in 
general and Estrin in particular gave rise to informed consent in this case, 
“then the client would bear the burden of identifying and understanding 
the full scope of any conflict of interest.”97  Of course, rules of professional 
conduct hold lawyers—not clients—responsible for recognizing conflicts 
of interest, and for protecting clients from their effects.98  As the court 
summarized the situation: 
A client’s knowledge that his law firm has, on previous occasions, 
represented parties that opposed the client in different matters does not 
provide an adequate foundation for informed consent with respect to a 
current simultaneous representation of two adverse clients with opposing 
interests in a specific dispute.  Gowlings does not claim that it provided 
to CenTra more specific information regarding the current conflict on 
which informed consent could have been based, because Gowlings itself 
admits that it was not aware until 2006 of the conflict with respect to the 
Bridge Plan.  It is, therefore, apparent that CenTra has at least established 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Gowlings fulfilled its 
obligation to inform CenTra of the full nature of the conflict arising from 
Gowlings’s simultaneous and adverse representation of CenTra and 
Windsor with regard to the Bridge Plan.99 
Digging in, Gowlings contended that CenTra’s continued retention of 
the firm after learning of prior, unrelated conflicts of interest counted as 
implied consent to the firm’s representation of Windsor regarding the 
Bridge Plan.100  As the court had already noted, however, client consent 
“must be determined on a conflict-by-conflict basis.”101  Although 
CenTra’s repeated use of Gowlings in years prior to Windsor and CenTra 
butting heads may have constituted consent to conflicts of interest arising 
during that time, it could not constitute consent to a prospective conflict 
unknown to CenTra.102  Plus, to prove implied consent under Michigan 
law, the lawyer must show that the client knew of the particular conflict.103  
                                                          
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 417. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 417–18. 
 101. Id. at 418. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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This Gowlings had not done.104  Accordingly, Gowlings was not entitled 
to summary judgment.105 
Weighing the evidence in the light most favorable to CenTra as the 
non-moving party, the Sixth Circuit determined that the district court erred 
in awarding Gowlings summary judgment.106  CenTra had “established 
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the conflict was consentable, 
whether CenTra was properly informed of the conflict, and whether 
CenTra’s actions indicated implied consent.”107  The court therefore 
reversed the district court and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.108 
CenTra involved direct adversity in related matters.  Perhaps less 
obviously, a lawyer’s representation of a client may be directly adverse to 
another current client even if the matters are unrelated.109  From lawyers’ 
standpoint, the lack of relation between the concurrent matters is no 
defense to a direct adversity conflict,110 although it may well be relevant 
to whether the client may consent to the conflict,111 or whether the law 
firm’s disqualification is required.112  Nor may a lawyer overcome a direct 
adversity conflict on the basis that the client to whom the lawyer is directly 
                                                          
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 419. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. El Camino Res., Ltd. v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 623 F. Supp. 2d 863, 877 (W.D. Mich. 2007) 
(quoting Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n., Inc. v. Carey Canada, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 255, 259 (S.D. Fla. 1990)); 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“Thus, absent consent, a 
lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other 
matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated.”).  See, e.g., Ill. State Bar Ass’n Prof’l Conduct, 
Adv. Op. 17-03, at 2–3 (2017), https://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/ethicsopinions/17-03.pdf [http 
s://perma.cc/X935-BNY5] (explaining that a lawyer could not represent a husband and wife in selling 
their house where the lawyer was representing the husband in a contemplated divorce from his wife 
although no petition for dissolution had been filed). 
 110. See, e.g., GSI Commerce Sols., Inc. v. BabyCenter, L.L.C., 618 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(“In this respect, it will not suffice to show that the two matters upon which an attorney represents 
existing clients are unrelated.”); Reed v. Hoosier Health Sys., 825 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2005) (“Reed contends IRPC 1.7(a)’s use of ‘directly’ indicates there must be some relation between 
the suits before disqualification is proper. . . .  However, IRPC 1.7(a)’s use of ‘directly’ refers to the 
adverse effect to the client not the attorney-client relationship.” (citations to the record omitted)). 
 111. See, e.g., Ill. State Bar Ass’n Prof’l Conduct, Adv. Op. 99-01, at 2 (1999), https://www.isba 
.org/sites/default/files/ethicsopinions/99-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LP3-VHCB] (ruling that a lawyer 
could not represent a husband in a divorce action while representing the wife in a custody proceeding 
because the matters were related in addition to the representations being directly adverse). 
 112. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Anodyne, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237–40 (S.D. 
Fla. 2005) (refusing to disqualify a law firm in a CERCLA cost recovery action or allow it to withdraw 
based on a direct adversity conflict where the firm’s representation of the movant in unrelated matters 
would not prejudice the movant in the environmental case).   
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adverse is represented by another lawyer in the matter.113  In sum, if a 
lawyer represents one client against a client that the lawyer (or the 
lawyer’s firm) simultaneously represents in an entirely unrelated matter, a 
direct adversity conflict exists.114 
B. Material Limitation Conflicts 
The second type of concurrent conflicts of interest—a material 
limitation conflict—arises when there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s 
representation of a client will be materially limited by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to someone else, or by the lawyer’s own interests.115  
Material limitation conflicts are more subtle than direct adversity conflicts 
and require a lawyer to evaluate whether “there is a significant risk that a 
lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course 
of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer’s 
other responsibilities or interests.”116  Normally, there is some pull on the 
lawyer’s judgment or something about the situation that prompts the 
lawyer to reflect on the propriety of accepting both representations.117 
Material limitation conflicts require careful study of the facts and 
circumstances of each matter.118  Indeed, by their very nature, the concepts 
of materiality and significant risk are case-specific.  In many instances, 
however, the material limitation on the lawyer’s representation will be 
“immediate, actual, and apparent.”119 
                                                          
 113. Quinn v. Anvil Corp., No. C08-0182RSL, 2008 WL 11344647, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 27, 
2008). 
 114. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 365 F. Supp. 2d at 1236 (acknowledging the direct 
adversity conflict). 
 115. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).  
 116. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 117. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Willey, 889 N.W.2d 647, 653–54 (Iowa 2017) 
(“The key questions a lawyer must ask are whether it is likely a difference of interests will occur 
between the clients and, if so, whether that difference in interests will interfere with the lawyer’s ability 
to offer independent, professional judgment to each client.” (citation omitted)); Commonwealth v. 
Cousin, 88 N.E.3d 822, 834–38 (Mass. 2018) (discussing situations that may present Rule 1.7(a)(2) 
conflicts); State ex rel. Union Planters Bank, N.A. v. Kendrick, 142 S.W.3d 729, 736 (Mo. 2004) 
(noting that this kind of conflict of interest “in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be 
available to the client”). 
 118. See, e.g., Georgine v. Airchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 326–30 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(concluding that class counsel did not have a material limitation conflict), vacated on other grounds, 
83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996); Saline Mem’l Hosp. v. Berry, 906 S.W.2d 297, 299–300 (Ark. 1995) 
(finding no material limitation conflict); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Woolery, 198 A.3d 835, 
851–52 (Md. 2018) (determining that the lawyer had a material limitation conflict of interest).   
 119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. c(iii) (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
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Perhaps the more difficult determination is whether the risk “is 
significant and plausible, even if it is not certain or even probable that it 
will occur.”120  The mere suggestion of a potential conflict of interest, or a 
mere possibility of divergent interests, is insufficient.121  The conflict must 
be clear and specific; it cannot rest on speculation.122  As the Iowa 
Supreme Court explained in Bottoms v. Stapleton,123 “only an actual 
conflict of interest, as defined in [Rule 1.7(a)(2)], will justify [a lawyer’s] 
disqualification.”124  Bottoms reflects the majority rule.125 
C. Conflicts in Superfund Litigation 
Superfund litigation may give rise to either direct adversity or material 
limitation conflicts of interest.126  To understand related conflicts, it is first 
necessary to understand some rudimentary aspects of CERCLA. 
Rather than framing a regulatory scheme, CERCLA establishes 
financial responsibility for cleaning up hazardous waste “facilities” or 
                                                          
 120. Id. 
 121. In re Penning, 930 A.2d 144, 155–56 (D.C. 2007); Frank Settelmeyer & Sons, Inc. v. Smith 
& Harmer, Ltd., 197 P.3d 1051, 1059 n.33 (Nev. 2008); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. c(iii) (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 122. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 356 (2010), https://www.dcbar.org/bar-
resources/legal-ethics/opinions/opinion356.cfm [https://perma.cc/5EV3-FPE6] (stating that a lawyer 
in a specialized industry may represent Client A in its attempt to acquire Company X, even though the 
lawyer’s experience suggests that it is likely other companies in the same industry, including one of 
her clients, will also bid to acquire Company X and oppose Client A’s bid because the lawyer cannot 
identify the nature of the conflict or the specific clients that might be affected). 
 123. 706 N.W.2d 411 (Iowa 2005). 
 124. Id. at 417 (referring to IOWA CT. R.  32:1.7).  Of course, “if there is a significant risk that 
representation of one client will materially limit the representation of another client, a conflict of 
interest actually exists; it is not merely potential.”  Id. 
 125. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Farm Fresh, Inc., 966 F.2d 142, 145 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that 
disqualification “may not be rested on mere speculation that a chain of events whose occurrence 
theoretically could lead counsel to act counter to his client’s interests might in fact occur” (citation 
omitted)); P&L Dev. LLC v. Bionpharma Inc., No. 1:17CV1154, 2019 WL 357351, at *4 (M.D.N.C. 
Jan. 29, 2019) (“Disqualification is a serious matter which cannot be based on imagined scenarios of 
conflict.” (quoting Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. Ciba Seeds, 933 F. Supp. 514, 517 (M.D.N.C. 1996)); 
Guillen v. City of Chicago, 956 F. Supp. 1416, 1422 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (stating that a lawyer should not 
be disqualified “unless there is a substantial basis for believing that actual, rather than merely 
potential, conflicts of interest are afoot”); Frank Settelmeyer & Sons, Inc., 197 P.3d at 1059 n.33 
(adopting the Bottoms court’s position). 
 126. Although the following discussion focuses on Superfund litigation initiated by the EPA, 
private parties may also pursue cost recovery actions under CERCLA.  See Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2012) 
(allowing private cost recovery actions); Jeffrey M. Gaba, The Private Causes of Action Under 
CERCLA: Navigating the Intersection of Sections 107(A) and 113(F), 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. 
L. 117, 126 (2015) (stating that 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) allows private parties to recover their 
response costs). 
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sites.127  The EPA has the power to undertake the cleanup of hazardous 
waste sites.128  To bestow the government with the resources to fulfill this 
responsibility, CERCLA created the federal Hazardous Substances Trust 
Fund, better known as the “Superfund,” to pay for government cleanup 
efforts.129  But more importantly for present purposes, CERCLA also 
empowers the EPA to recover “all costs of removal or remedial action” it 
incurs in remediating a hazardous waste site from potentially responsible 
parties—again, PRPs.130  Four categories of PRPs may be jointly and 
severally liable for the cost of cleaning up contaminated property: (1) the 
owner and operator of the site;131 (2) former owners and operators of the 
site;132 (3) generators, meaning “any person who by contract, agreement, 
or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a 
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous 
substances” at the site;133 and (4) transporters, meaning “any person who 
accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or 
treatment facilities . . . or sites selected by such person, from which there 
                                                          
 127. PHILIP WEINBERG & KEVIN A. REILLY, UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 282 (3d ed. 
2013).  
 128. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (2012). 
 129. Gaba, supra note 126, at 123 n.23. 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (2012).  The Sixth Circuit outlined CERCLA’s complicated web 
of cost-shifting provisions in Hobart Corp. v. Waste Management of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 
2014): 
The government may clean up the site itself under CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604; the 
government may compel a [PRP] to clean up the site through an action under CERCLA § 
106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606; or the government may enter into an agreement with a PRP under 
CERCLA § 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9622, that requires the PRP to clean up the site.  If the 
government removes the waste and remediates the site, it may recover its response costs 
from PRPs under § 107(a)(4); if a private party actually incurs response costs rehabilitating 
the site, it may partially recover those response costs under § 107(a)(4)(B).  In turn, any 
party sued under § 106 or § 107, by the government or a private party, may seek 
contribution from other PRPs under § 113(f)(1), so that the recovery costs can be 
distributed in an equitable fashion. 
  
Another option for the government is to clean up the site itself and enter into a settlement 
agreement with PRPs to cover the government’s response costs.  In this scenario, [under § 
113(f)(3)(B)] “[a] person who has resolved its liability to the United States . . . for some or 
all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in an administrative or 
judicially approved settlement may seek contribution from any [PRP] who is not a party to 
[the] settlement.”  In exchange for resolving its liability, [under § 113(f)(2)] the settling 
PRP “shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the 
settlement.”  
Id. at 762–63 (internal citations and footnote omitted). 
 131. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (2012). 
 132. Id. § 9607(a)(2). 
 133. Id. § 9607(a)(3).  In other words, a generator “is the party with whom the hazardous waste 
originated.”  WEINBERG & REILLY, supra note 127, at 288. 
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is a release, or threatened release” of hazardous substances for which 
cleanup costs must be incurred.134 
PRPs may be further classified as de minimis or major.  A party is 
typically classified as a de minimis PRP either because the amount of 
hazardous waste it contributed to the site or the toxicity of the waste it 
contributed to the site are slight in comparison to other hazardous 
substances at the site.135  The EPA calculates de minimis settlements using 
a fairly standard formula, such that  de minimis parties’ liability is 
generally easy to determine.136  Allocation disputes among de minimis 
PRPs are rare.137  “Given the breadth and scope of [CERCLA] liability, 
Superfund cases frequently involve numerous de minimis generator or 
transporter parties.”138 
PRPs may sue one another for contribution.139  CERCLA contribution 
actions are governed by federal law.140  In such cases, a district court may 
allocate response costs among responsible parties according to appropriate 
equitable factors.141  A lawyer whose PRP clients wanted to pursue 
contribution claims against each other in an adversary proceeding would 
face a conflict of interest.142  In some instances, parties’ agreement not to 
pursue contribution claims may eliminate any concurrent conflict of 
interest.143 
The sheer number of PRPs tied to any Superfund site means that any 
law firm with an environmental law practice may see multiple clients 
identified as PRPs or may find multiple PRPs approaching its 
                                                          
 134. § 9607(a)(4). 
 135. Id.; § 9622(g)(1)(A). 
 136. Kenefick et al., supra note 4, at 742–43. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 740–41. 
 139. § 9613(f). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.  Courts allocating response costs typically apply the so-called “Gore factors,” which are:  
(1) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a discharge, release, 
or disposal of hazardous waste can be distinguished; (2) the amount of the hazardous waste 
involved; (3) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved; (4) the degree of 
involvement by the parties in the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal 
of the hazardous waste; (5) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the 
hazardous waste concerned, taking into account the characteristics of such hazardous 
waste; and (6) the  degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal, State, or local officials 
to prevent harm to the public health or the environment.   
TDY Holdings, LLC v. United States, 885 F.3d 1142, 1146 n.1 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kerr-McGee 
Chem. Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 14 F.3d 321, 326 n.4 (7th Cir. 1994)).   
 142. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 143. See Va. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1508 (1993), https://www.vsb.org/docs/LEO/ 
1508.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GHG-SYPM] (applying then-existing Virginia disciplinary rules). 
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environmental lawyers for representation.  In fact, a hazardous waste site 
may have hundreds or thousands of PRPs.144  Naturally, as the Michigan 
State Bar Legal Ethics Committee observed: 
Having so many parties identified as PRPs often presents those parties 
with problems in obtaining specialized representation at a reasonable 
cost.  It would generally be impracticable, if not impossible, for each 
party to have separate counsel.  Transaction costs for a party can be 
minimized through common representation.  Most clients further prefer, 
whenever possible, to stay with counsel familiar with their business and 
operations.  If any given firm may represent only one PRP at any given 
site, most clients will be unable to obtain specialized representation at a 
reasonable cost, will be forced to utilize unfamiliar counsel, and there 
are serious questions raised regarding the sufficient availability of 
competent counsel experienced in Superfund matters.145 
CERCLA’s joint and several liability scheme further makes every 
PRP at least potentially adverse to every other PRP in some 
circumstances.146  As the Michigan State Bar observed in a rare ethics 
opinion on this subject: 
PRPs may initially challenge other PRP designations as de minimis vs. 
major.  Owners and generators are almost always antagonistic on issues 
of allocation.  Major and de minimis PRPs may argue over the 
appropriate levels of contribution by the de minimis PRPs.  PRPs may 
challenge the accuracy and/or completeness of another PRP’s Section 
104(e) disclosure [concerning the identification, nature, and quantity of 
materials which have been or are generated, treated, stored, or disposed 
of at a facility or transported to facility].  Major PRPs may argue over 
allocation of clean up and other costs.  All of these scenarios are possible 
in any given case.147 
As challenging as Superfund cases may be from a conflict of interest 
standpoint, it is possible to frame a few general rules.148  Lawyers must 
appreciate, however, that cases are fact-specific and that general rules have 
exceptions.  Furthermore, the existence or lack of a conflict of interest may 
depend on the scope of the lawyer’s representation.149 
                                                          
 144. Stein & Geht, supra note 5, at 731; Kenefick et al., supra note 4, at 726. 
 145. Mich. State Bar, Ethics Op. R-16 (1993), https://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/number 
ed_opinions/R-016 [https://perma.cc/CL6J-4RF7] [hereinafter Mich. Ethics Op. R-16]. 
 146. Kenefick et al., supra note 4, at 726. 
 147. Mich. Ethics Op. R-16, supra note 145, at 2. 
 148. This article does not attempt to address all conflicts of interest that may arise in CERCLA 
litigation. 
 149. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (allowing 
limited scope representations under certain conditions).  
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1. Representation of Multiple De Minimis PRPs 
A lawyer or law firm should be able to represent multiple de minimis 
PRPs in the same de minimis group without having to obtain consent from 
each client.150  If the lawyer is negotiating with the EPA for a lower overall 
share of liability for the clients’ category of PRP, the parties’ interests are 
aligned.  If the lawyer is advising the clients whether to settle with the 
EPA, the parameters for liability are clearly defined and the same for all.151  
In most cases, there is little chance of conflicts of interest dividing PRPs 
in the same de minimis group.152  If, however, the criteria for establishing 
de minimis status have not been determined at the time the law firm or 
lawyer is retained, the likelihood of a conflict developing increases 
because different PRPs may hold competing views on the criteria for de 
minimis classification.153  Then, depending on the facts, joint 
representation may be impossible or may require the affected clients’ 
informed consent.154 
2. Representation of De Minimis and Major PRPs 
Superfund cases are generally divided into two phases: remedy 
selection first and allocation of responsibility second.  Thus, a law firm 
may for years represent multiple parties who are aligned in interest in the 
selection of remedies but who become adverse in the allocation process.  
A law firm may navigate this situation by limiting the scope of its 
representation so that it will not represent one client against another in any 
allocation dispute.155  As this discussion suggests, however, a lawyer or 
law firm generally will be unable to represent a de minimis and a major 
PRP in the same case if the representation involves allocation issues.156  
The same is true if a major PRP objects to the “formulation of the de 
minimis category” of PRPs or “want[s] to . . . limit the scope of the 
                                                          
 150. Kenefick et al., supra note 4, at 742. 
 151. See Mich. Ethics Op. R-16, supra note 145, at 3 (“Given that de minimis PRPs in Superfund 
proceedings often settle according to a set multiplier (premium) of their volumetric contribution to the 
site, their interests are often aligned.”). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Kenefick et al., supra note 4, at 743. 
 154. See id. at 743–44 (suggesting that this situation could create a consentable Rule 1.7(a)(2) 
conflict). 
 155. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).  A client may always 
retain separate counsel to represent it in connection with any allocation issues or with respect to 
potential contribution claims against other PRPs.   
 156. Mich. Ethics Op. R-16, supra note 145, at 4. 
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release[s]” that de minimis PRPs execute.157 
On the other hand, if the lawyer or law firm represents either a de 
minimis or major PRP solely in unrelated matters and there are no 
allocation, categorization, or settlement issues in the CERCLA litigation, 
there may either be no material limitation conflict of interest or it may be 
possible to seek the clients’ consent to the conflict.158  Or, the terms of a 
de minimis settlement may be such that a law firm’s concurrent 
representation of a de minimis and a major PRP poses no conflict of 
interest.  Naturally, all these situations are case- and fact-dependent.159 
3. Representing Multiple Major PRPs 
Lawyers who represent current or former owners or operators of 
hazardous waste sites generally will be unable to represent generators or 
transporters in the same matter when the allocation of remediation costs 
between these categories of PRPs is at issue because of the resulting direct 
adversity conflicts of interest.160  “Each class will try to minimize its 
liability while maximizing the liability of the other classes.”161  For 
example: 
Generators typically argue that the owners/operators should bear 
significant liability because of the way they handled waste at the facility.  
For example, generators may argue that the operators greatly contributed 
to remediation costs by causing material to be released into the 
environment.  Conversely, the owners/operators will argue that they 
followed accepted standards and the high toxicity of the hazardous 
material supplied by the generators increased remediation costs.  
Additionally, the owners/operators may show that they took actions to 
address waste handling at the site properly.  EPA may consider the value 
of these initiatives, the degree of cooperation with public officials, and 
compliance with various regulations to determine liability allocation.162 
Direct adversity conflicts may also arise between owners and 
                                                          
 157. Kenefick et al., supra note 4, at 741.   
 158. Id. at 741–42.  
 159. See id. (“Ethical considerations become more difficult when a law firm represents an 
owner/operator or a major generator or transporter in a CERCLA matter, yet also represents de minimis 
PRPs in non-CERCLA matters. . . .  For example, to benefit the major PRP client, the law firm may 
wish to contest the de minimis settlement terms generally, or target a specific party’s de minimis 
status.” (footnote omitted)); see also Mich. Ethics Op. R-16, supra note 145, at 4 (noting that a lawyer 
will likely be disqualified from representing an owner and a generator in the same matter absent a 
prior binding agreement on cost allocation). 
 160. Mich. Ethics Op. R-16, supra note 145, at 4; Kenefick et al., supra note 4, at 735. 
 161. Kenefick et al., supra note 4, at 735 (footnote omitted). 
 162. Id. at 736 (footnotes omitted). 
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operators of hazardous waste sites if those entities or individuals are 
different.  For example, an owner who leases a site to an operator will 
likely attempt to allocate most of the liability for cleaning up the site to the 
operator.163  By way of further example, a current owner may want to argue 
that the greatest share of liability should be assessed against the former 
owner, or vice versa.164  A single lawyer or law firm cannot represent both 
parties in either instance.165 
Generators can find themselves adverse to one another.  For example, 
generators may contest the nature or relative noxiousness of the waste that 
each contributed to a site.166  Although observers have suggested that the 
generators can waive a common lawyer’s conflict of interest in this 
situation,167 whether a prudent lawyer should seek such consent may be a 
different story altogether depending on the facts.  On the other hand, 
multiple generators may knowingly agree to set aside for a time their 
differences over their respective obligations in the belief that presenting a 
unified front against other parties is more advantageous.168  In such a case, 
a single lawyer or law firm could, with the generators’ informed consent, 
represent them all.169  The lawyer or law firm could not, however, later 
argue for any allocation of liability or responsibility among them because 
the lawyer would then be preferring one client’s interests over another’s.170  
Also, it might be possible for a law firm to represent multiple generators 
individually rather than as a group so long as the firm does not represent 
one generator against another in attempting to allocate liability.171 
Finally, while transporters and generators may be aligned in some 
cases,172 their interests can diverge when it comes to allocating cleanup 
                                                          
 163. Id. at 736–37. 
 164. Id. at 737. 
 165. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 166. Kenefick et al., supra note 4, at 739. 
 167. Id. at 739–40. 
 168.  See, e.g., Acushnet Co. v. Coaters, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 41, 70 (D. Mass. 1997) (“[The 
plaintiffs] were free to forego pressing for judicial resolution of their conflicting interests and to agree 
that their common interest in presenting a unified position against CDE and other defendants . . . so 
far outweighs their conflicting interests among themselves that they are better served by foregoing 
pursuit of conflicts and acting together.”). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) 
(permitting limited scope representations under certain conditions). 
 172. See Kenefick et al., supra note 4, at 738 (“[A]t many Superfund sites, individual generators 
or transporters may share interests.  This is especially true for smaller operations and entities.  PRPs 
often distribute liability for the cleanup on a volumetric basis.  Therefore, the generators and 
transporters will share an interest in reducing both the overall investigation and remediation costs, as 
well as the costs attributable to their particular PRP group.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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costs.  Transporters may argue that generators should bear the greatest 
liability because they produced the hazardous substances, while generators 
should be expected to argue that transporters should be principally liable 
because they selected the disposal site.173  From a lawyer’s standpoint, 
these opposing positions create a non-consentable conflict of interest.174 
4. Summary 
As previously noted more than once, conflicts of interest in Superfund 
cases tend to be case- and fact-specific.  Consider, for example, the 
distinction between EPA cost recovery actions under 42 U.S.C. § 9607 and 
PRPs’ contribution actions under 42 U.S.C. § 9613.  CERCLA gives EPA 
the right to remedy contamination at a hazardous waste site and then sue 
basically anyone involved with the site under § 9607 to recover its costs.175  
As the Seventh Circuit once explained the linkage between § 9607 and § 
9613 actions, “CERCLA imposes a ‘pay-first, split-the-bill-later’ regime.  
Any [party] meeting certain statutory criteria can be required to pay for 
the cleanup.  Anyone who paid can then recover contribution from other 
responsible parties in accordance with that entity’s equitable share of the 
costs.”176 
Defendants’ liability in a cost recovery action under § 9607 is clearly 
joint and several because a single PRP may be held accountable for the 
entire cost of remediation at a site despite the existence of other 
polluters.177  PRPs’ relative degree of fault is simply irrelevant to the EPA 
or a private party plaintiff pursuing a cost recovery action under § 9607.178  
In contribution actions, on the other hand, “parties seeking contribution 
bear the burden of demonstrating a right to apportionment, identifying the 
other contaminating parties and the extent of their involvement.”179 In a 
contribution action under § 9613, a PRP plaintiff is entitled to recover only 
that sum that will result in an equitable distribution of response costs.180  
                                                          
 173. Id. 
 174. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) & (b)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 175. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012). 
 176. NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 177.  Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 2010).   
 178. WEINBERG & REILLY, supra note 127, at 298. 
 179. Id. at 303 (footnote omitted). 
 180. See Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Trainer Custom Chem., LLC, 906 F.3d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(“[W]hen a PRP must bear ‘more than its fair share’ of cleanup costs resulting from a § 107 cost 
recovery action, it can seek a more equitable distribution of those costs through a contribution action 
against other PRPs.”); Trinity Indus. v. Greenlease Holding Co., 903 F.3d 333, 348 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(“While § 107(a) authorizes complete cost recovery under a joint and several liability theory, § 113(f) 
permits a party to seek contribution from other PRPs . . . .”); Whittaker Corp. v. United States, 825 
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This difference between cost recovery and contribution actions matters for 
conflict of interest purposes because, depending on the facts and perhaps 
the court, a lawyer defending multiple PRPs may be able to defeat a 
contribution claim brought against one client without increasing other 
clients’ monetary liability. 
In addition, parties’ interests may change over time depending on the 
then-current issues and phase of the case.  For example, PRPs that are 
aligned in interest when trying to identify additional PRPs may see their 
interests diverge when it comes time to select a means of remediating the 
contamination at the site.  Parties’ interests also may shift during the 
allocation process, which may involve multiple phases, the staged 
resolution of disputed issues, and more.  It is frequently possible for 
lawyers and law firms to navigate related conflicts by carefully defining 
the scope of their representation.  Or, two parties may agree to postpone 
or sever the resolution of any issues on which they are adverse until all 
matters in which they have a common interest have been concluded, 
thereby permitting joint representation for the time being.181 
Finally, on a policy level, Superfund cases create a quandary.  They 
may involve hundreds or thousands of PRPs,182 many of whom have no 
dealings with each other, and most of whom coast along in groups for 
years as issues shake out.  All these parties deserve access to capable 
lawyers versed in this highly specialized area of law.  Yet the population 
of such lawyers is limited.183  The result is that lawyers and courts should 
approach conflicts of interest in Superfund cases pragmatically, keeping 
in mind that rules of professional conduct—including those governing 
conflicts of interest—are rules of reason.184  Recognizing that conflicts of 
interest cannot be based on speculation,185 theoretical forms of adversity 
that might someday develop should in many cases be discounted or at least 
temporarily disregarded when analyzing concurrent conflicts of interest.186  
Fortunately, environmental lawyers and parties to Superfund cases appear 
                                                          
F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2016) (“A party uses contribution to get reimbursed for being made to pay 
more than its fair share to someone else . . . .”).   
 181. See Patrick E. Donovan, Comment, Serving Multiple Masters: Confronting the Conflicting 
Interests that Arise in Superfund Disputes, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 371, 400–01 (1990) 
(explaining how this might work in a multiple representation of members of one class of PRPs).  
 182. Kenefick et al., supra note 4, at 725. 
 183. See Donovan, supra note 181, at 401 (“The number of law firms that have the capability of 
handling complex environmental tort defenses is typically much smaller than the number of PRPs that 
may be involved in any one Superfund case.” (footnote omitted)). 
 184. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope ¶ 14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 185. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text. 
 186. See generally Donovan, supra note 181, at 400 (discussing the need to balance the possibility 
that a conflict of interest will develop with the relative benefits of multiple representation).  
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to be taking realistic approaches to conflicts as evidenced by the scarcity 
of related cases and ethics opinions. 
D.  Obtaining Client Consent to a Conflict 
Once it is determined that a concurrent client conflict exists, the next 
question is whether the conflict may be cured by client consent.  In other 
words, whether it is possible for the concurrent representations to proceed 
notwithstanding the lawyer’s conflict of interest because the clients will 
waive the conflict.  Again, not all conflicts are consentable or 
“waiveable.”187 
A conflict of interest is consentable if three conditions are met.  First, 
the lawyer must reasonably believe that she will be able to competently 
and diligently represent each affected client.188  In other words, the lawyer 
must believe that each client can consent to the representation.189  Second, 
the representation must not be “prohibited by law.”190  Third, the 
representation cannot “involve the assertion of a claim by one client 
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or 
other proceeding before a tribunal[.]”191  Unless these three requirements 
are satisfied, the lawyer should not even attempt to obtain the client’s 
informed consent to the conflict, confirmed in writing, which is the final 
step necessary for the lawyer to proceed with the representation.192 
1. A Reasonable Belief of Competent and Diligent Representation 
For a conflict of interest to be consentable, Model Rule 1.7(b)(1) 
requires the lawyer to reasonably believe that she can competently and 
diligently represent each affected client.193  If the lawyer cannot clear this 
initial hurdle, client consent is impossible; indeed, the lawyer cannot even 
seek the client’s consent.194  A surprising number of lawyers seem to glide 
                                                          
 187. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 12, at 368. 
 188. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 189. Johnson v. Clark Gin Serv., Inc., No. 15-3290, 2016 WL 7017267, at *11 (E.D. La. Dec. 1, 
2016) (“When a lawyer represents more than one client . . . the question of consentability must be 
resolved as to each client.” (footnote omitted)); State ex rel. Horn v. Ray, 325 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2010) (“The question of consentability must be resolved as to each client.”); MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“When the lawyer is representing more 
than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to each client.”). 
 190. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 191. Id. r. 1.7(b)(3). 
 192. Id. r. 1.7(b)(4) (requiring “informed consent, confirmed in writing”). 
 193. Id. r. 1.7(b)(1). 
 194. Carnegie Cos. v. Summit Props., Inc., 918 N.E.2d 1052, 1067 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009). 
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past this requirement, blithely confident in their ability to ably represent 
their clients notwithstanding the clients’ competing interests.195  This is no 
time or place for incaution, however.  Model Rule 1.7(b)(1) imposes an 
objective standard.196  A lawyer’s subjective, good faith belief that she can 
fulfill her professional obligations to the affected clients notwithstanding 
any competing interests or obligations is therefore immaterial.197 
Under the objective standard, the “facts and circumstances that the 
lawyer knew or should have known at the time of undertaking or 
continuing a representation” are relevant, as opposed to what became 
known to the lawyer later or could not have been reasonably anticipated 
by the lawyer.198  Thus, a lawyer must familiarize herself with the facts 
underlying the proposed representation to determine whether she can 
competently and diligently represent each affected client.199 
While lawyers must honestly assess the circumstances and make a 
reasonable judgment that competent and diligent representation is 
achievable, best practices dictate that they not make that determination in 
isolation.  In short, when deciding whether to accept or continue a 
representation despite a concurrent conflict of interest, disinterested 
lawyers in the firm should participate in the Rule 1.7(b)(1) analysis. 
                                                          
 195. See Vicki J. Wright, Modern Conflicts of Interest, in ETHICS AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
PRACTICE 47, 55 (Irma S. Russell & Vicki J. Wright eds., 2017) (“With a little mental gymnastics and 
a self-serving paper trail, many attorneys will find a way to get around actual conflicts in order to take 
on a matter . . . .” (footnote omitted)).   
 196. People v. Mason, 938 P.2d 133, 136 (Colo. 1997); In re Stein, 177 P.3d 513, 519 (N.M. 2008); 
see Ferolito v. Vultaggio, 949 N.Y.S.2d 356, 363 (App. Div. 2012) (requiring that a “disinterested 
lawyer” believe that the conflicted lawyer can competently represent each client’s interests); Ill. State 
Bar Ass’n Prof’l Conduct, Adv. Op. 09-02, at 4 (2009), https://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/ 
ethicsopinions/09-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZS8-36M4] (explaining that a “reasonable belief is an 
objective standard predicated on what a disinterested lawyer would conclude as to whether the adverse 
clients would agree to the dual representation”). 
 197. In re Stein, 177 P.3d at 519.  See, e.g., So v. Suchanek, 670 F.3d 1304, 1310–11 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (rejecting as irrelevant the lawyer’s subjective belief that no conflict existed in his joint 
representation of a victim of a Ponzi scheme and the person who involved the victim in the scheme; 
rather, the analysis depended on whether an objective observer with the lawyer’s knowledge of the 
circumstances would have reasonably doubted his ability to undertake the joint representation); 
Robertson v. Wittenmyer, 736 N.E.2d 804, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that the lawyer could 
not have reasonably believed that the representation of one client against another was permissible and 
affirming the trial court’s disqualification order).   
 198. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. c(iv) (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
 199. Felix v. Balkin, 49 F. Supp. 2d 260, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Ariz. State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 
07-04 (2007), https://www.azbar.org/Ethics/EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=696 [https://per 
ma.cc/A6K6-UREQ]. 
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2. Representations Prohibited by Law 
Model Rule 1.7(b)(2) bars representations that are prohibited by 
law.200  Thus, if a court rule, a rule of professional conduct, a statute, or 
controlling case law forbids dual representation in the situation at hand, 
the issue of client consent is irrelevant because the representation may not 
proceed anyway.201 
Environmental cases often involve government agencies. In some 
states, government agencies may not be permitted to consent to conflicts 
of interest.  State ex rel. Morgan Stanley & Co. v. MacQueen202 is an 
illustrative case. 
MacQueen involved a lawsuit by the State of West Virginia against 
three financial institutions to recover investment losses sustained by the 
West Virginia Consolidated Fund.203  The West Virginia Attorney General 
appointed the law firm of Wolff Ardis to represent the State.204  Wolff 
Ardis also represented seven employees of the State Treasurer’s office 
when they were noticed for deposition as non-party witnesses.205  The 
defendants argued that these concurrent representations created a conflict 
of interest because the State had alleged in its complaints that the 
Treasurer’s office managed the Fund at all relevant times and that 
unnamed Treasurer’s office staff members contributed to cause the subject 
losses.206  The defendants further reasoned that because the staff controlled 
the disputed transactions, the State could only prove its case if it first 
established that the staff members (including Wolff Ardis’s clients) broke 
the law.207 
The court determined that the State’s allegations against the unnamed 
members of the Treasurer’s office created a concurrent conflict of interest 
for Wolff Ardis sufficient to disqualify the firm.208  The State argued that 
Wolff Ardis should not be disqualified because the seven staff members 
                                                          
 200. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 201. See, e.g., Brown v. Kelton, 380 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Ark. 2011) (holding that an Arkansas statute 
prohibited an insurance company from using in-house lawyers to defend its insureds); Baldasarre v. 
Butler, 625 A.2d 458, 467 (N.J. 1993) (adopting a bright-line rule prohibiting lawyers from 
representing the buyer and seller in complex commercial real estate transactions even if both parties 
consent); IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 32:1.7(c) (2012) (barring the representation of both 
parties in a marriage dissolution).   
 202. 416 S.E.2d 55 (W. Va. 1992). 
 203. Id. at 56–57. 
 204. Id. at 57. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id.  
 207. Id. at 59. 
 208. Id. at 59–60.  
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to be deposed had waived any conflicts.209  The problem, however, was 
that the State also had to consent to Wolff Ardis’s multiple representations, 
which was impossible under West Virginia law.210  The court so concluded 
based on its statement in an earlier case that “where the public interest is 
involved, an attorney may not represent conflicting interests even with the 
consent of all concerned.”211  This rule rests on the rationale that it is 
“essential that the public have absolute confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of our system of justice.”212  In light of the obvious public 
interest inherent in the State’s attempt to recoup its investment losses, the 
court explained, the State could not consent to “a dual representation 
which involve[d] such adversity of interests as to raise even the appearance 
of such impropriety.”213 
Fortunately for the State, the MacQueen court concluded that Wolff 
Ardis could remain in the case if the State dropped all allegations 
concerning the unnamed staff members in the Treasurer’s office.214  
Plainly anxious to retain Wolff Ardis as its counsel, the State had 
previously offered to amend its complaints to delete those allegations.215 
At least three courts have similarly held that governmental entities 
may not consent to conflicts of interest.216  New Jersey, which was one of 
the earliest states to take this position, now enforces its prohibition on 
public agency conflict waivers through New Jersey Rules of Professional 
Conduct 1.7(b)(1)217 and 1.9(d).218 
The better view holds that government clients’ ability to waive 
conflicts of interest should be evaluated under the customary rules 
governing conflicts.219  In other words, a government entity’s ability to 
waive a conflict of interest should depend on the facts and circumstances 
                                                          
 209. Id. at 60. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. (quoting Graf v. Frame, 352 S.E.2d 31, 38 (W. Va. 1986)). 
 212. Id. (quoting Graf, 352 S.E.2d at 38). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 61. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Guthrie Aircraft, Inc. v. Genesee Cty., N.Y., 597 F. Supp. 1097, 1098 (W.D.N.Y. 1984); In 
re Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics Op. No. 697, 911 A.2d 51, 57 (N.J. 2006); In re A. & 
B., 209 A.2d 101, 102–03 (N.J. 1965); City of Little Rock v. Cash, 644 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Ark. 1982), 
overruled on other grounds by T & T Chem., Inc. v. Priest, 95 S.W.3d 750, 753 (Ark. 2003). 
 217. N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(1) (2018) (providing that a public entity cannot 
consent to a concurrent client conflict of interest). 
 218. Id. r. 1.9(d) (“A public entity cannot consent to a representation otherwise prohibited by this 
Rule.”). 
 219. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. g(ii) (AM. LAW INST. 
2000). 
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of the case rather than on the entity’s status.220  Consistent with this view, 
several bar ethics committees have reasoned that government agencies or 
entities may waive conflicts of interest in most circumstances,221 as have 
several courts.222 
3. Representing Opposite Sides in the Same Lawsuit 
Model Rule 1.7(b)(3) prohibits any representation that involves the 
“assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by 
the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal.”223  
Indeed, a lawyer’s or law firm’s simultaneous representation of opposing 
parties in the same case is perhaps the most appalling conflict of interest 
conceivable.224  Client consent to such a conflict is ineffective.225 
                                                          
 220. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 204–05 
(N.D. Ohio 1976) (concluding that the city could waive the conflict of interest). 
 221. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-405, at 4–5 (1997) 
(discussing general conflict of interest principles in the representation of government entities); D.C. 
Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 268 (1996), https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/op 
inions/opinion268.cfm [https://perma.cc/3MQR-B7GX ] (explaining the conflicts of interest with city 
governments are consentable); Ill. State Bar Ass’n Prof’l Conduct, Adv. Op. 12-12, at 4 (2012), 
https://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/ethicsopinions/12-12_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF2F-JVXY] 
(noting that “Illinois law permits public entities to consent to [their lawyers’] conflicts of interest”); 
N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 629, at 3 (1992), https://www.nysba.org/WorkArea 
/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=7371 [https://perma.cc/FG6R-MHWD] (concluding that “where a lawyer is 
faced with a conflict of interest, and one of the affected parties is a governmental entity, the lawyer 
may accept or continue the representation with the entity’s consent,” provided that the lawyer meets 
certain basic ethical obligations). 
 222. See, e.g., City of Cleveland, 440 F. Supp. at 205 (concluding that the city could waive the 
conflict of interest); Miller v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 538 N.E.2d 1293, 1295–97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) 
(reasoning that a public entity may waive conflicts of interest); State ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Tobacco 
Co., 34 S.W.3d 122, 135–36 (Mo. 2000) (holding that the Missouri Attorney General was empowered 
to waive an alleged conflict of interest involving private lawyers handling tobacco litigation for the 
state). 
 223. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 224. See Synergy Tech & Design, Inc. v. Terry, No. C 06-02073 JSW, 2007 WL 1288464, at *7 
(N.D. Cal. May 2, 2007) (quoting Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 954 (Cal. 1994)); see also 
Jedwabny v. Phila. Transp. Co., 135 A.2d 252, 254 (Pa. 1957) (“No one could conscionably contend 
that the same attorney may represent both the plaintiff and defendant in an adversary action.”); Vinson 
v. Vinson, 588 S.E.2d 392, 396, 398–99 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (noting the trial court’s observation that 
the lawyer’s representation of both the husband and wife in a divorce was an outrageous conflict of 
interest and upholding the trial court’s sanctions award).   
 225. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 23 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“Paragraph 
(b)(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in litigation, regardless of the clients’ consent.” 
(emphasis added)).  See, e.g., Nunez v. Lovell, Civ. No. 2005-7, 2008 WL 4525835, at *3–7 (D.V.I. 
Oct. 3, 2008) (disqualifying a lawyer who represented the plaintiffs and a defendant in the same case 
despite the clients’ consent to the conflict). 
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4. Obtaining the Clients’ Informed Consent, Confirmed in Writing 
Finally, if a lawyer has met the requirements of Model Rules 
1.7(b)(1)–(3), she may avoid a concurrent client conflict of interest by 
obtaining the affected clients’ informed consent to the conflict and 
confirming it in writing.226  A client’s mere knowledge of a conflict is not 
sufficient for informed consent.  Rather, informed consent requires a 
client’s agreement “to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has 
communicated adequate information and explanation about the material 
risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of 
conduct.”227  The disclosures and explanation required to achieve informed 
consent necessarily depend on “the nature of the conflict and the nature of 
the risks involved” in the representation.228  And while a lawyer need not 
disclose to a client facts or implications about which the client already 
knows,229 a lawyer who withholds or glosses over material information 
pertinent to the client’s decision whether to consent to the conflict assumes 
the risk that the client will in fact be uninformed and that any consent 
obtained will prove to be invalid.230 
The amount of information necessary for the client to make an 
informed decision varies, but often pivots on the client’s level of 
sophistication, education, and experience, and whether the client has 
independent counsel.231  The more experienced a client is in legal matters 
generally, and in making decisions of the type involved in the case in 
which consent is sought in particular, the less information and explanation 
needed for a client’s consent to be informed.232 
Depending on the complexity or nature of the matter, the lawyer may 
want to advise the client to seek independent counsel to help evaluate the 
conflict of interest.233  Generally, a client who is represented by 
                                                          
 226. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).  
 227. Id. r. 1.0(e). 
 228. Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 18; see also MJK Family LLC v. Corp. Eagle Mgmt. Servs., 676 F. Supp. 2d 
584, 597 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (“The amount of disclosure required . . . depends on the circumstances.”). 
 229. Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Actavis Mid Atl. LLC, 927 F. Supp. 2d 390, 401–02 (N.D. Tex. 
2013). 
 230. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 231. Galderma Labs., 927 F. Supp. 2d at 401–03. 
 232. See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2001-2 (2001), 
https://www.nycbar.org/member-and-career-services/committees/reportslisting/reports/detail/formal-
opinion-2001-2-conflicts-in-corporate-and-transactional-matters [https://perma.cc/T4MK-H747] 
(“To be sure, sophisticated corporate and institutional clients can consent to conflicts which might be 
non-consentable in cases involving unsophisticated lay clients who are not represented by independent 
counsel in connection with the consent.”).   
 233. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
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independent counsel is presumed to have given informed consent to the 
proposed course of conduct.234  This is true regardless of whether the other 
lawyer is the client’s in-house counsel or an outside lawyer.235  To 
maximize the likely enforceability of the consent, lawyers should give 
clients adequate time to consider the information bearing on their 
decisions or to consult independent counsel.  Absent exigent 
circumstances, insisting that the client wait a reasonable time before 
consenting to the conflict will undermine any later argument that the client 
was unable to reflect on the situation or solicit another lawyer’s advice. 
Regrettably, lawyers too often fail to achieve clients’ informed 
consent to conflicts of interest.236  Roosevelt Irrigation District v. Salt 
River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District237 is an 
environmental case in point. 
Roosevelt Irrigation District was a CERCLA cost recovery action in 
which the Roosevelt Irrigation District (RID) sought to recover its costs 
incurred in addressing the contamination of its groundwater wells.238  In 
October 2008, RID hired the Phoenix law firm of Gallagher & Kennedy 
to first investigate and then pursue its claims through negotiation or 
litigation.239  At the time, Gallagher & Kennedy shareholder James Busby 
was representing Honeywell International (Honeywell) in a tax matter that 
had begun in May 2008 and ended in February 2009.240  RID ultimately 
sued various PRPs in February 2010, including Honeywell.241  Suing 
Honeywell proved to be consequential because two Gallagher & Kennedy 
lawyers who were not involved in the CERCLA case, James Derouin and 
Glen Hallman, had previously represented Honeywell in substantially 
related matters—Derouin while at another law firm and Hallman as in-
                                                          
 234. Id.  
 235. See Galderma Labs., 927 F. Supp. 2d at 400 (finding that for the purposes of determining 
informed consent, it does not matter whether the independent lawyer is in-house or outside counsel). 
 236. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Bank & Tr. Co. v. Mako One Corp., 919 F.3d 529, 536 (8th Cir. 2019) 
(explaining the law firm’s disclosure failures and concluding that the firm did not obtain the 
defendant’s informed consent to the conflict of interest, such that the defendant’s consent to the 
conflict was invalid); Johnson v. Clark Gin Serv., Inc., No. 15-3290 c/w 15-3314, 2016 WL 7017267, 
at *12 (E.D. La. Dec. 1, 2016) (finding no informed consent where the plaintiffs’ lawyers had their 
clients agree that they would not assert certain causes of action so as to avoid conflicts of interest 
among them rather than the lawyers explaining to their clients the implications of joint representation). 
 237. 810 F. Supp. 2d 929 (D. Ariz. 2011). 
 238. Id. at 937. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 957. 
 241. See id. at 938 (identifying Honeywell as one of two PRPs that moved to disqualify Gallagher 
& Kennedy from representing RID).   
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house counsel.242 
In September 2010, Honeywell moved to disqualify Gallagher & 
Kennedy based on Derouin’s and Hallman’s prior representation of it.243  
RID countered that Honeywell had waived any conflict of interest in July 
2009 while Busby represented it in the tax matter.244  Specifically, in July 
2009, Gallagher & Kennedy had written to Honeywell’s in-house tax 
counsel to explain that the firm’s environmental group was representing 
RID in connection with the contamination of its wells and that this 
representation could create a concurrent client conflict of interest with 
Honeywell.245  The letter asked Honeywell to waive the conflict and stated 
as follows: 
[U]nder the ethical rules governing lawyers, G & K and its attorneys may 
not oppose a current client (such as Honeywell), even on an unrelated 
matter, without full disclosure and consent. . . .  At this time, G & K is 
seeking Honeywell’s waiver and approval to allow G & K to pursue 
settlement negotiations with Honeywell on behalf of RID in this matter.  
If litigation becomes necessary, RID would engage separate counsel to 
pursue the litigation, unless G & K’s conflict is waived by Honeywell at 
that time.246 
Honeywell “conditionally” consented to Gallagher & Kennedy’s 
representation of RID three days later.247 
The Roosevelt Irrigation District court rejected RID’s waiver 
argument for good reason. For one thing, Honeywell certainly had no 
reason based on Gallagher & Kennedy’s letter to anticipate the firm’s 
representation of RID in litigation against it absent additional 
consultation.248  For another thing, but relatedly, Honeywell never gave 
informed consent to Gallagher & Kennedy’s conflict.249  Although not 
apparent from the portion of the firm’s waiver letter quoted in the opinion, 
the letter did not adequately disclose Honeywell’s former lawyers’ 
relationship with Gallagher & Kennedy.250  The letter referred only to 
                                                          
 242. Id. at 938–39.  
 243. Id. at 939. 
 244. Id. at 957. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. (quoting the waiver letter). 
 247. Id.  
 248. Id. at 958.  The waiver letter suggested that Gallagher & Kennedy was seeking a conflict 
waiver solely with respect to the tax matter and further stated that Gallagher & Kennedy would not 
represent RID in litigation against Honeywell absent Honeywell’s specific consent at the appropriate 
time.  Id.  
 249. Id. at 958–59. 
 250. Id. at 959. 
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Derouin’s prior representation of Honeywell while at his former law firm; 
it did not mention Derouin’s relocation to Gallagher & Kennedy.251  Plus, 
the letter said nothing about Hallman’s presence at the firm.252  Finally, 
there was no sign that Gallagher & Kennedy ever attempted to ensure that 
Honeywell had any other information it might need to make an informed 
decision whether to waive the firm’s conflict tied to the CERCLA 
litigation.253  The court therefore granted Honeywell’s motion to disqualify 
Gallagher & Kennedy.254 
Roosevelt Irrigation District highlights for lawyers the importance of 
meaningful communication with clients when seeking consent to a conflict 
of interest and the peril of relying solely on correspondence for that 
purpose.  In short, letters and e-mail messages: 
[Do] not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the 
client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation 
burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available 
alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider 
the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns.255 
As for the writing requirement, it is essential to remember that Model 
Rule 1.7 does not require a client’s written consent to a conflict of interest; 
it requires that the client’s consent be confirmed in writing.256  Thus, a 
lawyer may obtain the client’s consent in a meeting or over the telephone, 
for example, and comply with the rule through a confirming letter, e-mail 
message, or text message.  E-mail and text messages are “writings” in this 
context.257  State rules of professional conduct, however, may vary.258 
5. The Enforceability of Advance Conflict Waivers 
While lawyers may seek consent from clients at the time a concurrent 
conflict of interest arises, it is also ethically permissible for lawyers to 
obtain advance consent to future conflicts of interest.259  In fact, this 
                                                          
 251. Id.  
 252. Id.  
 253. Id. (quoting ARIZ. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.0 cmt. 6 (2019)). 
 254. Id. at 986. 
 255. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 256. Id. r. 1.7(b)(4). 
 257. Id. r. 1.0(n). 
 258. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) & (b) (2018) (requiring each client’s 
“informed written consent” to concurrent conflicts of interest).  
 259. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019); ABA Comm. on 
Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-436, at 1, 4–5 (2005); D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., 
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practice is common where sophisticated clients are concerned.260  The 
overarching test for the enforceability of advance conflict waivers remains 
the client’s informed consent.261  The lawyer bears the burden of proving 
the client’s informed consent.262 
Whether a court will consider consent to an advance waiver informed 
ordinarily depends on several factors, including the waiver’s specificity 
and scope; the caliber of the discussion between the lawyer and the client 
concerning the conflict; the nature of the conflict at hand; the client’s 
sophistication; whether independent counsel represented the client in 
giving consent; and “the interests of justice.”263  Like any other agreement 
between a lawyer and a client, a court will narrowly construe the scope of 
an advance waiver and resolve any ambiguities against the lawyer.264 
Based on the fact-intensive nature of the informed consent inquiry, 
there are few bright line rules guiding lawyers as to the enforceability of 
advance waiver provisions.  For that matter, because of the frequent 
difficulty of achieving informed consent, advance waiver provisions that 
might be characterized as open-ended are notoriously unreliable insurance 
against future disqualifying conflicts despite their ethical permissibility.265  
                                                          
Op. 309 (2001), https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/opinions/opinion309.cfm [https:// 
perma.cc/R7YA-V2JK] [hereinafter D.C. Op. 309]; N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial 
Ethics, Formal Op. 2006-1 (2006), https://www.nycbar.org/member-and-career-services/committees 
/reports-listing/reports/detail/formal-opinion-2006-1-multiple-representations-informed-consent-
waiver-of-conflicts [https://perma.cc/7P9G-PQPP] [hereinafter N.Y.C. Ethics Op. 2006-1].   
 260. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Föerderung der Wissenschaften E.V. v. Whitehead Inst. for 
Biomedical Research, 850 F. Supp. 2d 317, 324 (D. Mass. 2011). 
 261. Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Actavis Mid Atl. LLC, 927 F. Supp. 2d 390, 396 (N.D. Tex. 2013); 
Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. First Data Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2003); see MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“The effectiveness of [advance] waivers 
is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably understands the material risks that 
the waiver entails.”); D.C. Op. 309, supra note 259 (explaining the importance of the client’s informed 
consent when giving advance consent to a conflict); N.Y.C. Ethics Op. 2006-1, supra note 259 
(explaining that an advance conflicts waiver requires the client’s informed consent).   
 262. Galderma Labs., 927 F. Supp. 2d at 398. 
 263. W. Sugar Coop. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 98 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1082–83 (C.D. Cal. 
2015) (citing Visa U.S.A., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1106); Lennar Mare Island, LLC v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 
105 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1115 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Visa U.S.A., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1106). 
 264. See, e.g., GSI Commerce Sols., Inc. v. BabyCenter, LLC, 618 F.3d 204, 212–13 (2d Cir. 
2010) (concluding that the lawsuit in question did not fall into the category of cases covered by the 
parties’ advance waiver provision); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 965 F. Supp. 2d 
104, 118 n.12 (D.D.C. 2013) (rejecting the law firm’s argument that the advance waiver covered the 
client’s entire corporate family); Brigham Young Univ. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-890 TS BCW, 
2010 WL 3855347, at *2–3 (D. Utah Sept. 29, 2010) (construing the advance waiver to apply to the 
law firm’s clients with open intellectual property matters as of the day the consenting client signed the 
agreement, as opposed to covering all of the law firm’s current and future clients with intellectual 
property matters). 
 265. See, e.g., S. Visions, LLP v. Red Diamond, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1327 (N.D. Ala. 2019) 
(“[G]iven the advance waivers’ lack of specificity, the lack of evidence that Red Diamond was fully 
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On the other hand, the closer the actual conflict of interest is to that which 
the parties contemplated at the time the client agreed to the advance 
waiver, the more likely it is that a court will enforce the waiver.266  
Furthermore, while a clear link between the prospective and actual 
conflicts is certainly desirable, a lack of specificity regarding an 
identifiable future client or matter encompassed by the waiver does not 
necessarily render an advance conflict waiver unenforceable.267  An open-
ended advance waiver may still be enforceable if the language outlines an 
approach to determining the firm’s obligations should a conflict surface, 
“adequately explains the material risk to [the client] of waiving future 
conflicts of interest,” and identifies for the client “reasonably available 
alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.”268  This is particularly true 
where the client is sophisticated.269  Of course, an advance waiver will not 
excuse a lawyer’s failure to disclose a known current conflict of interest.270 
IV. FORMER CLIENT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
As with current client relationships, lawyers’ relationships with 
                                                          
counseled regarding their import, and especially the fact that directly adverse litigation between two 
direct competitors like Red Diamond and Southern Visions is an extremely serious conflict most 
clients would be unwilling to waive, the court is unable to conclude that the advance waivers, standing 
alone, provided Red Diamond’s effective consent to this conflict.”); Mylan, Inc. v. Kirkland & Ellis 
LLP, No. 15-581, 2015 WL 12733414, at *18–19 (W.D. Pa. June 9, 2015) (rejecting an advance 
conflicts waiver for lack of informed consent). 
 266. David D. Dodge, Eye on Ethics: Advance Waivers to Potential Conflicts, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Jan. 
2009, at 8, 8; see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“[I]f the 
client agrees to consent to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then 
the consent ordinarily will be effective with regard to that type of conflict.”). 
 267. See, e.g., Simpson Strong-Tie Co. v. Oz-Post Int’l, LLC, No. 3:18-cv-01188-WHO, 2018 WL 
3956430, at *14–19 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2018) (commenting on the scope of the advance waiver and 
ultimately declining to disqualify the law firm).  
 268. See, e.g., In re Fisker Auto. Holdings, Inc. Shareholder Litig., No. 13-2100-DBS-SRF, 2018 
WL 3991470, at *4 (D. Del. Aug. 20, 2018) (upholding an advance waiver); Macy’s Inc. v. J.C. Penny 
Corp., 968 N.Y.S.2d 64, 65–66, (App. Div. 2013) (reasoning that the advance waiver was adequate, 
and that the plaintiffs’ law firm should not be disqualified). 
 269. In re Fisker, 2018 WL 3991470, at *4 (noting that the client was “experienced in hiring large 
national law firms” in a case in which the law firm whose advance waiver was challenged was a large 
national law firm); Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Actavis Mid Atl. LLC, 927 F. Supp. 2d 390, 402–03 (N.D. 
Tex. 2013) (discussing the client’s sophistication in enforcing an advance waiver).  
 270. See, e.g., Galderma Labs., 927 F. Supp. 2d at 402–03 (“If a conflict of interest is known to 
an attorney at the time he seeks a waiver, the attorney is not allowed to hide that conflict, regardless 
of whether the client is sophisticated or not.”); Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M 
Mfg. Co., 425 P.3d 1, 17 (Cal. 2018) (“Because this case concerns the failure to disclose a current 
conflict, we have no occasion here to decide whether, or under what circumstances, a blanket advance 
waiver . . . would be permissible.  We conclude, rather, that without full disclosure of existing conflicts 
known to the attorney, the client’s consent is not informed for purposes of our ethics rules.” (footnote 
omitted)).  
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former clients may create conflicts of interest.271  This is true in 
environmental law as elsewhere.  In fact, one of the seminal former client 
conflict cases frequently cited by courts, GTE North, Inc. v. Apache 
Products Co.,272 arose out of a CERCLA cost recovery action.273 
Former client conflicts are regulated under state ethics rules based on 
Rule 1.9 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.274  Model Rule 1.9 
provides: 
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related 
matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the 
interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed 
consent, confirmed in writing. 
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a 
substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer 
formerly was associated had previously represented a client 
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and 
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 
and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter; unless the former client gives 
informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose 
present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall 
not thereafter: 
(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the 
former client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to 
a client, or when the information has become generally known; or 
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules 
would permit or require with respect to a client.275 
Model Rule 1.9 and state analogs aim to protect a former client’s 
reasonable expectation that confidential information a lawyer or law firm 
acquires during a representation will not later be used to the former client’s 
                                                          
 271. “If a lawyer represents a client in more than one matter, the client is a current client if any of 
those matters is active or open.”  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 481, at 
6 (2018).  “[T]he termination of representation in one or more matters does not transform a client into 
a former client if the lawyer still represents the client in other matters.”  Id.   
 272. 914 F. Supp. 1575 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 273. Id. at 1577–78. 
 274. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 275. Id. 
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detriment when the lawyer or law firm is asked to undertake a new 
representation adverse to the former client.276  And even where 
confidentiality is not a concern, Rule 1.9 ensures lawyers’ continuing duty 
of loyalty to former clients,277 although only to the extent that the matters 
implicating the lawyer’s duty of loyalty are the same or substantially 
related.278  Most former client conflict controversies involve Rule 1.9(a). 
A. Model Rule 1.9(a) Conflicts 
For there to be a conflict of interest under Model Rule 1.9(a), the 
lawyer’s current and prior representations must involve either the same 
matter or substantially related matters.279  A superficial resemblance or 
incidental similarity between the two matters is insufficient.280  Rather, 
two matters should be considered substantially related if (1) “they involve 
the same transaction or legal dispute”; or (2) “there otherwise is a 
substantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally 
have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance 
the client’s position in the subsequent matter.”281  Accordingly, the 
“substantial relationship test” can be broken down into two separate 
inquiries: Does the current representation involve the same work the 
lawyer performed for the former client?  Alternatively, is there a 
substantial risk that the lawyer acquired confidential information in the 
former client’s representation that would materially advance the new 
client’s representation?282  The first question asks about matter-specific 
conflicts, while the second inquires about information-specific conflicts. 
1. Analyzing Matter-Specific Conflicts of Interest 
For a matter-specific conflict of interest to materialize under Model 
                                                          
 276. Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2012-100, at 1 
(2012), http://www.pabar.org/members/catalogs/Ethics%20Opinions/formal/f2012-100.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/G57Q-MVU4] [hereinafter Pa. Ethics Op. 2012-100]. 
 277. Utah State Bar Ethics Adv. Op. Comm., Op. 12-01, at 2 (2012), https://www.utahbar.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/2012-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/AVM4-Z2H7] [hereinafter Utah Ethics Op. 
12-01]. 
 278. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 14.07, at 14–15 (4th ed. 
2013 & Supp. 2018) (describing lawyers’ duty of continuing loyalty as “something of a misnomer, 
because lawyers may take adverse legal action against a former client, no matter how antagonistic or 
serious (and thus ‘disloyal’), so long as the matters are not substantially related.” (footnote omitted)).   
 279. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 280. Nev. Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 152 P.3d 737, 742 (Nev. 2007); 
Foley-Ciccantelli v. Bishop’s Grove Condo. Ass’n, 797 N.W.2d 789, 815 (Wis. 2011). 
 281. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 282. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).  
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Rule 1.9(a), “the matters must merely involve the same transaction or legal 
dispute.”283  Whether current and former matters involve the same 
transaction or legal dispute is determined by inquiring into whether the 
two matters are factually related.284  The matters must turn on the same 
facts of a particular situation or transaction, as opposed to simply 
involving the same type of legal issues.285  The comments to Model Rule 
1.9 elaborate on this point: 
When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, 
subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse 
interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a 
lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is 
not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct 
problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves 
a position adverse to the prior client.286 
A distinction therefore exists between pursuing a claim against a former 
client on a specific transaction or legal dispute versus adversity centered 
on a category or type of legal problem that a lawyer handled on a recurring 
basis.287 
Regarding the first scenario, the duty of loyalty prohibits a lawyer 
from depriving a former client of the benefit of the lawyer’s work on the 
former client’s behalf.288  It is thus generally accepted that a current matter 
is substantially related to a former client’s representation if the current 
matter involves the same work the lawyer performed for the former 
client.289  This brand of former client conflict of interest is particularly 
severe when a lawyer attacks her earlier work or legal advice—a situation 
sometimes colloquially characterized as fouling one’s own nest.290 
                                                          
 283. In re Conduct of Hostetter, 238 P.3d 13, 23 (Or. 2010) (emphasis omitted). 
 284. Watkins v. Trans Union, LLC, 869 F.3d 514, 520 (7th Cir. 2017); Newton v. Stoneridge 
Apts., 424 P.3d 1086, 1091 (Utah Ct. App. 2018); see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 
2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (explaining that the scope of a matter depends on the facts of a specific 
situation or transaction). 
 285. Watkins, 869 F.3d at 521 (quoting IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 2).  
 286. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 287. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 3:07-CV-0858 (PCD), 2008 WL 649189, at *11 (D. 
Conn. Jan. 22, 2008) (“To the extent Schaefer worked on individual discrimination claims as in-house 
counsel to GE, such work entailed a ‘recurrently handled type of problem,’ in which case Rule 1.9 is 
not implicated by her working on a new and wholly distinct gender class action discrimination claim.” 
(citations omitted)).   
 288. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 289. In re Conduct of Hostetter, 238 P.3d 13, 21–23 (Or. 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 290. See, e.g., Annie Sloan Interiors, Ltd. v. Kappel, No. 19-807, 2019 WL 2492303, at *1–3 (E.D. 
La. June 14, 2019) (alleging breach of fiduciary duty and violation of Rule 1.9(a) where the lawyer 
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In contrast to scenarios where a lawyer attacks her prior work for the 
client, it is ordinarily permissible for a lawyer who has repeatedly handled 
a general type of legal problem for a client to later oppose that client in a 
factually distinct case.  “Where a lawyer handles recurrent yet factually 
distinct problems,” the factual information that a lawyer acquires in a 
representation is “not necessarily relevant to later matters”; hence, “there 
is no substantial risk that the [lawyer] could use the information to gain an 
unfair advantage.”291  The upshot is that while a lawyer clearly cannot 
switch sides in a specific transaction or matter, the lawyer’s representation 
adverse to a former client in the same type of legal matter that she handled 
for the former client may be a different story.292  Model Rule 1.9(a) allows 
for representations opposite former clients to touch upon the particular 
problem area in which legal advice was previously rendered.  When two 
matters “rely on the same legal theories but involve different facts, the two 
                                                          
helped a client register its trademarks and later represented another client in attacking the trademarks); 
Acad. of Allergy & Asthma in Primary Care v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 384 F.Supp.3d 644, 
659–60 (E.D. La. 2018) (concluding that representations “are substantially related where counsel 
advises its current client on the subject matter it had previously advised its former client, in an effort 
to help the current client to prevail over the former on a critical issue shared between the two 
representations”; the law firm “placed itself in the position of attacking its own prior advocacy made 
on behalf of its former client”); Paul v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 17, 21–22 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(disqualifying a lawyer who supervised the negotiation and drafting an agreement as Judicial Watch’s 
general counsel, then represented the plaintiff against Judicial Watch in a matter directly arising from 
that agreement; the “very type of ‘changing of sides in the matter’ forbidden by Rule 1.9”); Oasis W. 
Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 250 P.3d 1115, 1124–25 (Cal. 2011) (holding that a former client stated 
claims for breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and breach of contract where the lawyer 
represented the client in obtaining a city council’s approval for a redevelopment project, and two years 
later campaigned to thwart the project by soliciting signatures on a petition to overturn the project’s 
approval); ASI Holding Co. v. Royal Beach & Golf Resorts, LLC, 163 So. 3d 668, 670–71 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2015) (disqualifying a law firm because its representation placed it in a position of “attacking 
the validity of the very document that it had previously represented to be valid and legally binding”); 
In re Basco, 221 S.W.3d 637, 639 (Tex. 2007) (disqualifying a hospital’s defense lawyer and his law 
firm because the lawsuit required him to challenge the validity of his former law partner’s legal advice 
to the plaintiff doctor). 
 291. Villas at Highland Park Homeowners Ass’n v. Villas at Highland Park, LLC, 394 P.3d 1144, 
1153 (Colo. 2017); see ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-415, at 5 n.10 
(1999) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 99-415] (explaining that “it is not sufficient for the matters 
merely to be problems of a similar type” for purposes of the substantial relationship test); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 cmt. d(iii) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) 
(observing that “a lawyer may master a particular substantive area of the law while representing a 
client, but that does not preclude a lawyer from representing another client adversely to the first in a 
matter involving the same legal issues, if the matters factually are not substantially related”).  
 292. See Watkins v. Trans Union, LLC, 869 F.3d 514, 521–22 (7th Cir. 2017) (stating that where 
a lawyer defended Trans Union in hundreds of Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) cases over a two-
year period, and almost ten years later represented a FCRA plaintiff against Trans Union, the 
representations did not turn on the same facts of one particular situation or transaction because the 
plaintiff’s FCRA claim was unique to him and not interwoven with any  case in which the lawyer had  
represented Trans Union).   
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matters are not generally considered to be substantially related.”293 
2. Analyzing Information-Specific Conflicts 
Even if the prior and current matters do not involve the same 
transaction or legal dispute, they are still substantially related if there is “a 
substantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally 
have been obtained [by the lawyer] in the prior representation would 
materially advance the [new] client’s position in the subsequent matter.”294  
This aspect of the substantial relationship test is information specific and 
assumes the view of a hypothetical reasonable lawyer.295  The crux of the 
issue is “whether a reasonable lawyer would perceive a substantial risk 
that a competent attorney would normally have learned confidential 
factual information during the prior representation that could be used 
against the former client in the new matter.”296 
To prove there is a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential 
information that could harm the former client’s interests in the subsequent 
matter, the former client is not required to divulge the confidential 
information allegedly disclosed to the lawyer.297  A contrary rule would 
ironically force former clients to reveal the very confidences and secrets 
Rule 1.9 is intended to protect.298  As a result, courts focus on the nature 
of the legal services that the lawyer provided the former client and the kind 
                                                          
 293. United States ex rel. Bumbury v. Med-Care Diabetic & Med. Supplies, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 3d 
1268, 1275 (S.D. Fla. 2015).  See, e.g., Nicholas v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., No. 05-119, 2013 WL 
1196960, at *6 (D.V.I. Mar. 21, 2013) (observing that a lawyer is not precluded from representing a 
client adverse to a former client simply because the cases involve “the same legal issues if the matters 
factually are not substantially related”); Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am.,  v. Bradley, 961 So.2d 1071, 
1072–74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (finding no substantial relationship where the lawyer defended a 
nursing home in over sixty cases alleging negligence tied to residents’ pressure ulcers and falls and 
later left his law firm and sued the nursing home alleging neglect and failure to monitor the 
development of residents’ pressure ulcers; the subsequent representation was a “wholly distinct 
problem” that turned on its own facts). 
 294. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 295. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 871 (2011), https://www.nysba.org/ 
CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=5204 [https://perma.cc/2QDC-92LV]. 
 296. Id.  
 297. Bowers v. Ophthalmology Grp., 733 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2013); Velazquez-Velez v. 
Molina-Rodriguez, 235 F. Supp. 3d 358, 362 (D.P.R. 2017) (quoting Starlight Sugar Inc. v. Soto, 903 
F. Supp. 261, 266 (D.P.R. 1995)); Headfirst Baseball LLC v. Elwood, 999 F. Supp. 2d 199, 2111 
(D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Derrickson v. Derrickson, 541 A.2d 149, 151 (D.C. 1988)); Koch v. Koch 
Indus., 798 F. Supp. 1525, 1536 (D. Kan. 1992); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 
1008 (2014), https://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=49178 [https://perma.cc/S 
KJ6-A4NT] [hereinafter N.Y. Ethics Op. 1008]; Pa. Ethics Op. 2012-100, supra note 276, at 3. 
 298. W. Sugar Coop. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 98 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2015) 
(citing Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980)); N.Y. Ethics Op. 1008, supra note 297; Pa. 
Ethics Op. 2012-100, supra note 276, at 3–4. 
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of confidential factual information that the lawyer would have typically 
received during the representation.299  This may include examining 
whether “(a) the lawyer and the client ought to have talked about particular 
facts during the course of the representation, or (b) the information is of 
such a character that it would not have been unusual for it to have been 
discussed between lawyer and client during their relationships.”300 
Evidence that a lawyer actually received confidential information 
relating to the prior representation is unnecessary for Rule 1.9(a) 
purposes.301  If it is reasonable to infer that the lawyer received information 
during the first representation that might be useful in the second 
representation, thereby creating a substantial risk of exploitation of that 
information, then the two matters are substantially related.302  All the same, 
proof of the lawyer’s “actual receipt of confidential information in the 
prior matter [is] even more compelling than a mere likelihood of its 
receipt.”303  A former client’s conclusory or unsupported allegations that 
she shared confidential information during the prior representation, 
however, ought not be considered.304 
The existence of a substantial relationship triggers the presumption 
that the lawyer possesses confidential information that can be used for the 
current client’s benefit and the former client’s detriment.305  In most 
jurisdictions, the presumption is irrebuttable.306  In others, it is “rebuttable 
                                                          
 299. Bowers, 733 F.3d at 652–53; Headfirst Baseball LLC, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 210–11; Villas at 
Highland Park Homeowners Ass’n v. Villas at Highland Park, LLC, 394 P.3d 1144, 1153 (Colo. 
2017). 
 300. Pa. Ethics Op. 2012-100, supra note 276, at 4; see also Atmosphere Hosp. Mgmt. Servs., 
LLC v. Royal Realties, LLC, 28 F. Supp. 3d 692, 697 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (expressing the same test 
(quoting Alpha Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Rentenbach, 792 N.W.2d 344, 356–57 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010)). 
 301. Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1983); Annie Sloan 
Interiors, Ltd. v. Kappel, No. 19-807, 2019 WL 2492303, at *7 (E.D. La. June 14, 2019); In re Conduct 
of Hostetter, 238 P.3d 13, 23 (Or. 2010). 
 302. Fernandez v. St. Francis Hosp., No. 09C-03-008-JRS, 2009 WL 2393713, at *3 (Del. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 3, 2009). 
 303. N.Y. Ethics Op. 1008, supra note 297; see N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, 
Op. 922 (2012), https://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=3723 [https://perma.cc/Y 
TM5-2PFE] (recognizing that matters are “substantially related if the lawyer in question actually and 
knowingly obtained (and now possesses) confidential factual information that would materially 
advance the prospective client’s position in the subsequent matter”).   
 304. Aubrey v. D Mag. Partners, L.P., No. 3:19-CV-0056-B, 2019 WL 2103699, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 
May 14, 2019); Worley v. Moore, 807 S.E.2d 133, 140 (N.C. 2017). 
 305. N. Am. Deed Co. v. Joseph, 334 B.R. 443, 455 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005); Koch v. Koch Indus., 
798 F. Supp. 1525, 1536 (D. Kan. 1992). 
 306. United States v. Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F.3d 227, 240 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting DeFazio 
v. Wallis, 459 F. Supp. 2d 159, 164–65 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (collecting cases)); United States v. Stiger, 
413 F.3d 1185, 1196 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 
1985)), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Ellis, 868 F.3d 1155, 1175 (10th Cir. 2017); 
Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 800 (5th Cir. 2000); Mt. Hebron Dist. Missionary Baptist Ass’n of 
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but difficult to overcome.”307 
Applying this framework has proven to be laborious because of the 
varying ways in which courts articulate the substantial relationship 
analysis.  One line of authority concentrates on a fact-based comparison 
of the two matters.308  Another line of authority holds that the present and 
prior representations must involve common subject matters, issues, or 
legal problems.309  A third line of authority requires the relationship 
between the matters to be “patently clear” or for the matters to sport 
“identical issues.”310  Finally, a fourth approach focuses on the similarities 
between the factual circumstances and legal theories of the current and 
former representations, as well as the degree of the lawyer’s 
                                                          
Ala., Inc. v. Sentinel Ins. Co., No. 3:16-cv-658-CDL-GMB, 2017 WL 3928269, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 
7, 2017); Janczewski v. Janczewski, 94 N.Y.S.3d 142, 145 (App. Div. 2019); In re Thetford, 574 
S.W.3d 362, 373 (Tex. 2019). 
 307. In re MCK Millennium Ctr. Retail, LLC, 571 B.R. 783, 786 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017) (citing 
LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Lake Cty., 703 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1983)).  
 308. See, e.g., Whatcott, 757 F.2d at 1100 (requiring “the factual contexts of the two 
representations [to be] similar or related” (quoting Tr. Corp. of Mont. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 
85, 87 (9th Cir. 1983)); FMC Techs., Inc. v. Edwards, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1159 (W.D. Wash. 2006) 
(applying a “‘factual context’ test”); Koch, 798 F. Supp. at 1536 (focusing on “the similarities between 
the factual bases of the two representations” and noting that “[a] commonality of legal claims or issues 
is not required”); In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d at 374 (“[P]roducing specific overlapping facts is 
necessary to show substantial relation, [but] it is not sufficient. . . .  [T]hose facts [must further] create 
a genuine threat of disclosure” (internal quotation marks omitted)); ABA Formal Op. 99-415, supra 
note 291, at 23 (stating that the standard “inevitably requires a factual inquiry comparing the two 
matters”). 
 309. See, e.g., In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 625 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the “two 
representations need only involve the same ‘subject matter’ in order to be substantially related”); Acad. 
of Allergy & Asthma in Primary Care v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 384 F. Supp. 3d 644, 657–⁠58 
(E.D. La. 2018) (concluding that representations are substantially related where a lawyer advises a  
current client on the subject matter she had previously advised a former client about to help the current 
client prevail over the former client on a critical issue common to both representations); FDIC ex rel. 
AmTrust Bank v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., No. 1:08CV2390, 2012 WL 3912764, at *7 
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 7, 2012) (requiring a “commonality of issues between the prior and present 
representation” (quoting Campbell v. Indep. Outlook, Inc., No. 04AP-310, 2004 WL 2892884, at *3 
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2004)); Estate of Pew, 655 A.2d 521, 545 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (stating that 
the fact that representations involve similar or related facts is not alone sufficient, but “rather the test 
is whether information acquired by an attorney in his former representation is substantially related to 
the subject matter of subsequent representation”). 
 310. See, e.g., Gov’t of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739–40 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Such 
considerations have . . .  [honed] the ‘substantial relationship’ test . . . to granting disqualification only 
upon a showing that the relationship between issues in the prior and present cases is ‘patently 
clear’. . . .  [D]isqualification has been granted or approved recently only when the issues involved 
have been ‘identical’ or ‘essentially the same’.” (citations omitted)); Calamar Enters., Inc. v. Blue 
Forest Land Grp., LLC, 222 F. Supp. 3d 257, 265–66 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (requiring a patently clear 
relationship between the matters); Giambrone v. Meritplan Ins. Co., 117 F. Supp. 3d 259, 272 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (requiring the relationship between the issues in the two cases to be “patently clear”); 
Revise Clothing, Inc. v. Joe’s Jeans Subsidiary, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 381, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(quoting Gov’t of India, 569 F.2d at 739–40); Becker v. Perla, 5 N.Y.S.3d 34, 35 (App. Div. 2015) 
(requiring the issues in the competing matters to be “identical or essentially the same”). 
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involvement.311 
As one might expect, whether prior and current representations are 
substantially related is a fact-intensive inquiry.312  Considerations that may 
guide the analysis include (1) the scope of the representations set forth in 
the engagement letters; (2) whether the matters share a common subject 
matter, legal issues, causes of action, or key witnesses or evidence; (3) 
whether the matters involve the same events, or a series of matters or 
transactions that reveal the former client’s pattern of conduct; (4) whether 
time has rendered all or part of the former client’s information obsolete; 
(5) whether the former client’s information has since been disclosed to the 
public; (6) whether the lawyer’s knowledge of the former client’s 
“playbook,” that is, its operations, litigation strategies, business practices, 
negotiating philosophy, ability to satisfy debts, or decision-making is 
relevant to the current matter; (7) the duration of the lawyer’s relationship 
with the clients; and (8) the nature of the lawyer’s services.313 
3. Representative Cases 
State ex rel. Swanson v. 3M Co.314 is an interesting former client 
conflict case with environmental law roots.  In Swanson, the global law 
                                                          
 311. See, e.g., Zerger & Mauer LLP v. City of Greenwood, 751 F.3d 928, 933 (8th Cir. 2014) (“To 
determine if matters are substantially related, we must examine the factual and issue relationship 
between the two representations.”); Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Epik Learning, LLC, No.16-cv-04269-
EDL, 2017 WL 2986604, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2017) (“The existence of a substantial relationship 
depends on the similarities between the two factual situations, the legal questions posed, and the nature 
and extent of the attorney’s involvement.”); Jessen v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 877, 887–
88 (Ct. App. 2003) (deeming two matters substantially related when “[confidential] information 
material to the evaluation, prosecution, settlement or accomplishment of the former representation 
given its factual and legal issues is also material to the evaluation, prosecution, settlement or 
accomplishment of the current representation given its factual and legal issues”); Villas at Highland 
Park Homeowners Ass’n v. Villas at Highland Park, LLC, 394 P.3d 1144, 1153 (Colo. 2017) 
(describing the substantial relationship test as “a process of factual reconstruction’ that ‘cannot be 
limited to the consideration of ultimate legal issues, but must account for facts and circumstances, [the 
underlying] legal theories and strategies [and facts that would be necessary to prove or disprove those 
theories], and even the nature and scope of the attorney’s involvement in the former representation” 
(quoting People v. Frisco, 119 P.3d 1093, 1096 (Colo. 2005)); State ex rel. Swanson v. 3M Co., 845 
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firm Covington & Burling, LLP (Covington) found trouble when it 
represented the State of Minnesota (the State) in litigation against the 3M 
Co.315  The litigation involved 3M’s manufacture and disposal of 
perfluorochemicals (PFCs).316  Covington had previously represented 3M 
in connection with 3M’s development of fluorochemical (FC) products.317 
In 1992, 3M retained Covington lawyer Peter Hutt to represent it in 
securing FDA approval for FC food packaging products.318  Hutt’s 
representation of 3M later expanded to include a range of advice on legal 
and regulatory issues affecting 3M’s FC products.319  Although 3M 
stopped manufacturing FCs domestically in 2000, Covington continued to 
represent 3M on FC-related matters until 2006.320  In the process, the 
firm’s lawyers obtained information from 3M about the health effects of 
FC exposure.321 
In 2007, 3M entered into an agreement with the Minnesota Pollution 
Control Agency (MPCA) that required 3M to help abate PFC pollution.322  
Conjunctively, 3M had to disclose numerous documents regarding the 
environmental and health effects of PFCs, including documents regarding 
the treatment and disposal of PFC waste and its characterization as 
hazardous.323  3M also had to work with the MPCA and another state 
agency to formulate health and toxicology studies related to PFCs.324 
In May 2010, 3M hired Covington in regard to a retiree benefits 
issue.325  Covington finished that matter in September 2010.326  In 
November 2010, the State approached Covington about representing it in 
natural resource damages (NRD) litigation against 3M for discharging 
PFCs into surface and ground waters.327  Covington was a logical choice 
for the State because the firm had previously represented it in 
environmental matters.328  On December 22, 2010, Covington asked 3M 
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to send an e-mail formally terminating the firm’s representation on the 
retiree benefits matter; 3M promptly complied.329  A week later, 
Covington began representing the State in the NRD litigation on a 
contingent fee basis.330  The firm entered its appearance in the NRD case 
in January 2011.331 
The parties engaged in voluminous and expensive discovery.332  
Discovery was scheduled to close on June 1, 2012.333  In late March 2012, 
3M’s lead outside lawyer in the NRD case, William Brewer, sent a letter 
to Covington in which he stated: “It has just come to our attention that 
Covington previously represented 3M for the purpose of providing 3M 
with legal advice concerning legal and regulatory issues associated with 
its fluorochemical business.”334 3M demanded that Covington withdraw 
from the State’s representation in the NRD litigation but Covington 
refused.335 
In fact, between Covington’s first appearance in the NRD case and 
3M’s demand that Covington withdraw, 3M’s then-general counsel 
Marschall Smith twice signaled to Covington lawyers that he knew that 
the firm may have a conflict of interest.336  More particularly: 
Smith exchanged e-mails with Covington attorney Daniel Spiegel on 
April 8, 2011. . . .  Although Spiegel initially replied that he was unaware 
of the [NRD] case, Spiegel sent a second e-mail confirming Covington’s 
representation of the State . . . .  Spiegel explained that Covington had 
performed work for 3M before Smith’s tenure but “the work stream from 
3M basically ended.”  Smith responded, “Sure, makes perfect sense . . . 
you do have to represent your clients.  Nothing personal.  Hope we can 
get back to you after this is over.” . . .  [I]n a November 16, 2011 letter 
to Covington attorneys Mitchell Dolin and Benedict Lenhart, Smith 
wrote, “We did not raise the conflict issue when you filed the lawsuit on 
behalf of the State, but perhaps we should have.”337 
In April 2012, 3M moved to disqualify Covington as counsel for the 
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State, arguing that Minnesota’s version of Rule 1.9(a) barred Covington 
from representing the State in the NRD case because the NRD case was 
substantially related to the firm’s earlier  work for 3M in FC matters.338 
Soon thereafter, 3M separately sued Covington in a Minnesota state court 
for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract tied to the firm’s 
representation of the State in the NRD case.339 
In October 2012, the trial court in the NRD case held that Covington 
had violated Rule 1.9(a) and disqualified the firm as counsel for the 
State.340  The court reasoned that the NRD case and Covington’s 
representation of 3M in its FC business were substantially related matters 
because both involved the potential health and environmental effects of 
FC exposure.341 The court also concluded that a client cannot impliedly 
waive the right to disqualify its former lawyer.342 
The State and Covington each appealed to the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s disqualification order.343  Both 
the State and Covington then successfully petitioned the Minnesota 
Supreme Court for review.344 
After deciding that Covington had standing to appeal the 
disqualification order, the Swanson court focused on whether the NRD 
litigation was substantially related to Covington’s representation of 3M in 
FC matters.345  The court thus had to “analyze the extent to which the 
factual and legal issues in the two representations overlap and examine 
any other relevant circumstances.”346  The court also needed to consider 
whether confidential information that 3M shared with Covington in its 
prior representation had since been publicly disclosed and whether the 
information had become obsolete due to the passage of time.347 
The trial court had determined that Covington learned confidential 
information in its prior representation of 3M in FC matters.348  The trial 
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court further presumed that the information was shared with all Covington 
lawyers.349  Unfortunately, the trial court did not (1) meaningfully evaluate 
Covington’s claims that the pertinent information was no longer 
confidential because 3M had disclosed it to the MPCA and the public; or 
(2) analyze whether 3M waived its attorney-client privilege by suing 
Covington.350  Nor did the trial court consider whether there was a 
significant risk that the State could exploit any of 3M’s remaining 
confidential information in the NRD case.351  As a result, the trial “court 
abused its discretion by failing to [analyze] all legally relevant factors” 
before determining that the NRD case and the FC matters were 
substantially related.352 
The Swanson court next recognized that a party may waive the right 
to disqualify opposing counsel based on a Rule 1.9(a) conflict.353  In doing 
so,354 the Swanson court aligned itself with most courts to have considered 
the issue.355 
Having found that a party may waive a conflict of interest, the court 
examined whether 3M had waived Covington’s conflict.356 “Waiver” 
requires a party’s “knowledge of the right” in question and the “intent to 
waive it.”357  Factors that circumstantially evidence a party’s intent to 
waive opposing counsel’s disqualification include “(1) the length of the 
delay in bringing the motion to disqualify, (2) whether the movant was 
represented by counsel during the delay, and (3) the reason for the 
delay.”358  A court evaluating waiver allegations should also “consider any 
relevant actions and statements” by the allegedly waiving party.359  In this 
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case: 
The district court did not conduct an implied-waiver analysis, but in 
rejecting the State’s waiver argument, the district court discussed the 
dispute regarding when 3M became aware of the extent of Covington’s 
prior representation of 3M.  The district court’s findings regarding the 
timing focus on the personal knowledge of then–3M General Counsel 
Smith.  The district court found that Smith lacked actual knowledge of 
the potential conflict when the NRD case was filed.  The district court 
also found that 3M’s outside counsel . . . did not learn of the potential 
conflict until March 2012 and promptly sought Covington’s 
disqualification thereafter.360 
But the trial court’s concentration on Smith’s and Brewer’s knowledge 
was analytically flawed because: 
To be legally relevant, the analysis must focus on the party to whom the 
right belongs.  Because 3M [was] the party with the right to object to any 
conflict, the legally relevant point in time for determining the length of 
the delay in asserting the right to seek disqualification [was] when 3M 
[was] deemed to have learned of the conflict. . . .  Here, in addition to 
whether and when Smith and Brewer acquired actual knowledge of the 
potential conflict, the inquiry must consider whether other 3M 
employees or agents, such as other 3M in-house counsel, already held 
knowledge that is relevant to determining when 3M learned of the 
potential conflict.361 
Considering its decision that implied waiver is not a defense to a 
disqualification motion, the trial court never performed the intensely 
factual waiver analysis that was required.362  The resulting lack of factual 
findings prevented the Swanson court from effectively reviewing the 
State’s and Covington’s contentions that 3M waived its right to disqualify 
Covington.363 
Finally, the State argued that even if 3M did not waive its right to seek 
Covington’s disqualification and Covington violated Rule 1.9(a), the trial 
court “was not required to disqualify Covington because the equities 
weigh[ed] against disqualification.”364  The court made short work of this 
meritless argument, pointing out that Rule 1.9(a) controlled the case and 
mandated application of the substantial relationship test.365 
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The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that because the trial court 
did not consider all legally relevant factors in analyzing Covington’s 
disqualification under Rule 1.9(a) and because it mistakenly reasoned that 
a party cannot impliedly waive the right to disqualify opposing counsel, 
the case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.366  
In February 2016, the trial court, on remand, held that Covington had 
violated Rule 1.9 but that 3M had waived the right to seek the firm’s 
disqualification.367  In February 2017, Covington confidentially settled 
3M’s lawsuit against it.368  In February 2018, the State settled the NRD 
litigation for $850 million, with Covington receiving a $150 million 
contingent fee.369 
Another recent Rule 1.9(a) case, Lane v. BP p.l.c.,370 arose out of 
contamination emanating from an Oklahoma Superfund site known as the 
Wilcox Site.  Years earlier, the land comprising the Wilcox Site had been 
home to an oil refinery.371 
Bristow First Assembly of God (the Church) was located on the 
Wilcox Site.372  The Church’s pastor, Mark Evans, and his family lived in 
the Church until the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality 
(ODEQ) warned them that remaining there would be unhealthy.373  In June 
2015, the Evans family sued several defendants in an Oklahoma state court 
for negligence, nuisance, trespass, fraud and strict liability, including 
energy conglomerate Kinder Morgan, Inc.374  The Evanses were 
represented by three law firms: Durbin Larimore & Bialick, Devore & 
Jorgenson, PLC, and Michael J. Blaschke, P.C.375  Kinder Morgan 
removed the suit to federal court.376 
A Kinder Morgan subsidiary, the El Paso Corporation (El Paso), had 
known about the contamination at the Wilcox Site since late 2011, when 
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ODEQ approached it about entering into a voluntary cleanup or 
Brownfields program to address contamination at the site.377  ODEQ was 
on El Paso’s trail because the Wilcox Oil Co., which had operated the 
polluting refinery, had merged with the Tenneco Oil Co. in 1965, and El 
Paso had acquired Tenneco in 1996.378  Kinder Morgan acquired El Paso 
in 2012.379 
After ODEQ’s overture, El Paso retained David Kearney, then a 
partner at the GableGotwals law firm, to investigate the company’s 
involvement with the Wilcox Site.380  Kearney subsequently represented 
El Paso at a December 2011 meeting with ODEQ officials, collaborated 
with other GableGotwals lawyers in addressing ODEQ’s claims, and 
helped ghostwrite a letter for El Paso’s general counsel in which El Paso 
disclaimed responsibility for cleaning up the Wilcox Site.381  El Paso’s 
denial of liability apparently rested on ODEQ’s alleged failure to assert 
related claims against an entity known as the EPEC Oil Company 
Liquidating Trust (the Trust) within a prescribed ten-year period.382 
In 2018, Kinder Morgan learned that Kearney, who was by then a 
partner at Durbin Larimore, had led GableGotwals’s prior representation 
of El Paso.383  Kinder Morgan demanded that all three of the plaintiffs’ 
law firms withdraw from the case based on Kearney’s alleged conflict of 
interest.384  When they refused, Kinder Morgan moved to disqualify 
Durbin Larimore.385 
In the Tenth Circuit, which includes Oklahoma, “a party seeking to 
disqualify opposing counsel pursuant to [Rule] 1.9(a) must establish that 
(1) an actual attorney-client relationship existed between the moving party 
and the opposing counsel; (2) the present litigation involves a matter that 
is ‘substantially related’ to the subject of the movant’s prior 
representation; and (3) the interests of the opposing counsel’s present 
client are materially adverse to the movant.”386  “If the movant satisfies the 
first two prongs,” there is an “irrebuttable presumption” that the client 
revealed information to the lawyer that requires the lawyer’s 
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disqualification.387  Sequential matters are “substantially related” for 
purposes of Oklahoma’s version of Rule 1.9(a) “if they involve the same 
transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that 
confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained in 
the prior representation would materially advance the client’s position in 
the subsequent matter.”388 
It was clear that Kearney once shared an attorney-client relationship 
with El Paso and that Kinder Morgan later acquired El Paso.389  It was also 
clear that Kinder Morgan’s interests and the plaintiffs’ interests were 
materially adverse.390  The plaintiffs argued, however, that the two matters 
were not substantially related because only ODEQ and El Paso were 
parties to the prior matter and El Paso’s only basis for then declining to 
participate in cleaning up the Wilcox Site was ODEQ’s alleged failure to 
timely assert claims against the Trust.391  The plaintiffs reasoned that 
because Kinder Morgan had not raised ODEQ’s failure to pursue the Trust 
as a defense in this case, there was no conflict of interest.392  The Lane 
court, however, rejected the plaintiffs’ restrictive view of the relationship 
between the two matters: 
Both matters involve[d] the alleged contamination of the Wilcox site by 
the former Wilcox Company, which merged with Tenneco Oil Company 
in 1965.  El Paso is the successor to Tenneco and Kinder-Morgan 
acquired El Paso in May 2012.  The Complaint in this case specifically 
reference[d] [ODEQ’s] earlier attempt to persuade El Paso to participate 
in remediation of the Wilcox site and El Paso’s rejection of that request 
based on the existence of the Trust—the very matters Mr. Kearney 
handled on behalf of El Paso.  Plaintiffs are now pursuing . . . damages 
and injunctive relief, based on the same alleged contamination.  
Accordingly, it is beyond question that the interests of Mr. Kearney’s 
current clients—the plaintiffs in this case—are materially adverse to 
Kinder Morgan.393 
The next question was whether Kearney’s conflict of interest could be 
imputed to Durbin Larimore since Kearney was not counsel of record in 
the current case.394  The short answer under Oklahoma Rule of 
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Professional Conduct 1.10(a) was yes.395 
Retreating, the plaintiffs contended that because Kinder Morgan did 
not move to disqualify Durbin Larimore until the litigation was well 
underway, it had waived its right to seek the firm’s disqualification.396  
This argument received a chilly reception from the Lane court.  As the 
court explained, the plaintiffs’ argument was “not consistent with law or 
the professional rules and would place an undue burden on former clients 
to know every member of a law firm upon that firm’s entry of 
appearance.”397  Furthermore, Kearney never alerted Kinder Morgan to the 
issue, and Kinder Morgan was oblivious to the conflict until it reviewed 
thousands of documents in response to a discovery motion by the 
plaintiffs.398  Kinder Morgan learned of the dispute between El Paso and 
ODEQ when reviewing documents for production to the plaintiffs, 
matched Kearney to that matter, identified the conflict of interest, and 
moved to disqualify Durbin Larimore three days later.399  On those facts, 
the Lane court concluded that Kinder Morgan had acted reasonably 
promptly and that it had not waived its right to seek Durbin Larimore’s 
disqualification.400 
The Lane court granted Kinder Morgan’s motion to disqualify Durbin 
Larimore.401  The DeVore Law Firm and Blaschke remained in the case 
for the plaintiffs.402 
4. Summary 
Absent client consent, Model Rule 1.9(a) prohibits a lawyer from 
representing a client if the proposed matter is the same or substantially 
related to a former client’s matter, and the current and former clients’ 
interests are materially adverse.403  The centerpiece of this standard, the 
substantial relationship test, normally requires an analysis of the factual 
and legal similarities of the two representations, as well as the nature and 
extent of the lawyer’s involvement.  The greater the similarities between 
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the facts and the legal issues involved, the greater the chance that the two 
representations will be deemed to be substantially related. 
From a risk management perspective, limiting the scope of the new 
client’s representation may help a lawyer avoid disqualification in a matter 
that is substantially related to a former client’s representation.  As the 
District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Committee explained: 
[A] lawyer may limit the scope of the new representation such that 
factual information normally obtained in the prior matter would be 
legally irrelevant to the advancement of the current client’s position in 
the new matter.  Specifically, by agreeing only to represent a client as to 
a discrete legal issue or with respect to a discrete stage in the litigation, 
a lawyer may be able to limit the scope of the representation such that 
the new matter is not substantially related to the prior matter.  
Restrictions on the scope of the representation that effectively ensure that 
there is no substantial risk that confidential factual information as would 
normally have been obtained in the prior representation would be useful 
or relevant to advance the client’s position in the new matter may, under 
certain circumstances, be sufficient to avoid a conflict of interest.404 
As to be expected, any limitation on the current client’s representation 
must be reasonable under the circumstances and requires the client’s 
informed consent.405 
B. Former Clients and Lawyers’ Lateral Movement 
Lateral movement by lawyers between law firms is now common.406  
Lawyers may change firms several times during their careers.  These 
moves may create former client conflicts of interest for a lawyer and her 
new firm.  Phrased as a question, when a lawyer changes law firms and 
seeks to represent a client in the same or substantially related matter in 
which the client’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of a client 
from the lawyer’s prior firm, does a former client conflict of interest 
disqualify the lawyer (and her new law firm) from that representation? 
1. The Model Rule 1.9(b) Framework 
In this era of lawyer mobility, Model Rule 1.9(b) offers specific 
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guidance where a lawyer’s previous law firm has represented the former 
client at issue.  Model Rule 1.9(b) states: 
A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or 
substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer 
formerly was associated had previously represented a client . . . whose 
interests are materially adverse to that person; and . . . about whom the 
lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that 
is material to the matter; unless the former client gives informed consent, 
confirmed in writing.407 
By its terms, Model Rule 1.9(b) establishes three requirements for 
disqualifying a lawyer (and her current law firm by imputation) based on 
work performed for a client at the lawyer’s prior law firm: (1) the current 
client’s matter must be the same as, or substantially related to, the former 
client’s matter; (2) the current and former clients’ interests must be 
materially adverse; and (3) the lawyer must have acquired confidential 
information about the former client’s matter that is material to the current 
client’s matter.408 
The third element is pivotal.  A violation of Rule 1.9(b) only occurs if 
a lawyer at her prior law firm acquired confidential information about the 
former client that is material to the current client’s matter.409  If while 
working at the prior law firm the lawyer acquired no knowledge or 
information relating to the particular client, and the lawyer subsequently 
joins a new law firm, then “neither the moving lawyer, nor the [lawyer’s] 
new firm, are disqualified from representing” another client in the same or 
substantially related matter even though  the two clients’ interests 
conflict.410 
Recall that under Model Rule 1.9(a), there generally is an irrebuttable 
presumption that a lawyer received the former client’s confidential 
information in a substantially related matter.411 Under Rule 1.9(b), it is 
presumed that a lawyer possesses material, confidential information 
through her association with her prior firm but this presumption is 
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rebuttable.412  The lawyer or her law firm bears the burden of proving the 
lawyer’s lack of actual knowledge of the former client’s material, 
confidential information.413  A lawyer’s general access to a former client’s 
protected information will not trigger Rule 1.9(b).414  If the lawyer does 
not have actual knowledge of the former client’s protected information, 
disqualification is inappropriate.415 
2. Screening to Avoid a Rule 1.9(b) Conflict of Interest 
If a lateral lawyer has actual knowledge of a former client’s protected 
information, she may be able to avoid disqualification by obtaining the 
former client’s consent to her representation of her current client.416  If the 
former client will not consent, under Model Rule 1.10(a)(2), the lawyer’s 
new firm may nonetheless avoid imputation of the lawyer’s conflict if the 
firm (1) timely screens the lawyer from participation in the matter; (2) 
apportions the lawyer no part of the related fee; and (3) promptly notifies 
the former client in writing, including, “a description of the [firm’s] 
screening procedures employed [and] a statement of the firm’s and of the 
screened lawyer’s compliance with the[] Rules.”417  In short, Model Rule 
1.10(a)(2) allows the new law firm to unilaterally erect an ethical screen 
to avoid imputed disqualification.  Approximately thirty states have 
adopted the Model Rule 1.10(a)(2) approach with some variation.418 
Timely screening of the lateral lawyer is essential to avoid 
disqualification of the lawyer’s firm, as Stimson Lumber Co. v. 
International Paper Co.419 demonstrates.  There, Stimson Lumber Co. 
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(Stimson) owned the Bonner Mill in Montana, home to a sawmill and a 
plywood manufacturing plant.420  Stimson had purchased the Bonner Mill 
from International Paper Co.’s (International) predecessor in interest, 
Champion International Corp. (Champion), in 1993.421  When Stimson 
faced the expensive cleanup of pollution at Bonner Mill, it sued 
International under CERCLA and the equivalent Montana statute.422  
Stimson alleged that Champion was responsible for some portion of the 
property’s contamination and that Champion’s liability for remediation 
costs passed to International as its successor in interest.423 
Stephen Brown and Elena Zlatnik of Garlington, Lohn & Robinson 
(Garlington) were Stimson’s local counsel.424  Brown previously 
represented Champion with respect to matters in dispute in the CERCLA 
case.425  In 1993, while an associate at another law firm, Brown worked on 
Champion’s sale of the Bonner Mill to Stimson.426  The sale terms were 
squarely at issue in Stimson’s suit against International.427  Brown also 
knew of certain environmental issues that Champion disclosed to Stimson 
when negotiating the sale.428 
Prior to July 26, 2010, when Stimson filed suit, its lead counsel, Steve 
Olson, asked Brown to serve as Stimson’s local counsel.429  Brown then 
ran a conflicts check which flagged his work for Champion on the sale of 
the Bonner Mill.430  Brown nevertheless agreed to represent Stimson in its 
suit against International and participated in the lawsuit as counsel of 
record for Stimson.431 
On September 21, 2010, International’s counsel, Thomas Grever, 
wrote to Brown to protest his conflict of interest based on his prior 
representation of Champion.432  Grever advised Brown that International 
did not consent to his representation of Stimson in the CERCLA case.433 
On October 20, 2010, Brown wrote Grever back, asserting that his 
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prior legal work for Champion was unrelated to this case.434  Even so, 
Brown asked International Paper to waive the alleged conflict of 
interest.435  International declined his request.436 
Given International’s refusal to waive the conflict, Brown and Olson 
agreed that Brown should withdraw from Stimson’s representation.437  
Brown moved to withdraw on November 29, 2010.438  Around the same 
time, Garlington erected an ethical wall that insulated Brown from the 
firm’s other lawyers who continued to represent Stimson in the case.439  
Brown informed Grever of this precaution.440  Brown’s and Garlington’s 
efforts gave no comfort to International, however, which promptly moved 
to disqualify Brown, Zlatnik, and the entire Garlington firm from 
Stimson’s representation.441 
Garlington argued that disqualification was inappropriate because it 
had screened Brown from continued participation in the CERCLA case.442  
The Stimson Lumber court rejected the firm’s argument because its effort 
to screen Brown came too late.443  Brown began representing Stimson and 
actively participated in this case since late July 2010, yet the firm did not 
implement the ethical screen until the tail end of November 2010.444  As 
the court explained, “[w]here screening mechanisms are not immediately 
implemented, and are instead instituted only after the conflicted attorney’s 
former client asserts the existence of a conflict, the ethical screen is not 
timely implemented.”445  Furthermore, despite the screen, Brown 
continued to work in close proximity to Zlatnik and any other Garlington 
lawyers who might represent Stimson in the CERCLA litigation.446  This 
fact supported a conclusion that Garlington’s ethical screen was 
ineffective.447 
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The Stimson Lumber court determined that Garlington had not timely 
screened Brown from participation in Stimson’s lawsuit against 
International and that the firm’s screening procedures were ineffective to 
boot.448  It accordingly granted International’s motion to disqualify Zlatnik 
and Garlington.449 
C. The Material Adversity Requirement 
Both Model Rules 1.9(a) and (b) include a “material adversity” 
requirement.450  In other words, for there to be a conflict of interest under 
either rule, the current and former client’s interests must be materially 
adverse in addition to the two representations being the same or 
substantially related.  Although Rule 1.9 does not attempt to define 
material adversity,451 the issue is seldom contested.  This is because most 
alleged conflicts relating to former clients arise when a lawyer is 
representing a new client suing a former client (or vice versa), and the 
alignment of the new and former clients as foes in litigation clearly 
satisfies the material adversity requirement.452  A more complicated 
question arises when a former client is not directly involved in the current 
matter at issue, but may be affected by it in some manner.  Zerger & Mauer 
LLP v. City of Greenwood453 is such a case. 
Zerger & Mauer LLP represented the city of Greenwood, Missouri 
(Greenwood) in a dispute with Martin Marietta Materials (Martin) arising 
out of a rock quarry located south of the city.454  The controversy centered 
on Martin truck traffic traveling through Greenwood and creating a public 
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nuisance, with Martin finally settling for $7 million.455  As part of the 
settlement, Greenwood designated Second Avenue for the truck traffic—
“the route it deemed most beneficial to the [c]ity”—and “declared that the 
truck traffic along that route was reasonable and was not a [public] 
nuisance.”456 
About one year later, Zerger & Mauer filed a private nuisance action 
on behalf of multiple plaintiffs with property interests along Second 
Avenue against Martin and other entities involved in hauling rock from 
the quarry.457  Not long afterwards, Greenwood—now a non-party—
“moved to disqualify Zerger [&] Mauer from representing the individual 
plaintiffs.”458  According to Greenwood, the firm was “advancing 
arguments in the [private nuisance] litigation that directly conflicted with 
Greenwood’s interests.”459  The district court agreed and disqualified 
Zerger & Mauer.460 
The Eight Circuit affirmed the district court, first finding that the 
matters were substantially related.461  The Eighth Circuit also analyzed 
whether the plaintiffs’ interests were materially adverse to Greenwood’s 
interests.462  In the court’s view, Greenwood’s interests in its settlement 
agreement with Martin would be harmed if the plaintiffs’ private nuisance 
claim disrupted Martin’s use of Second Avenue, which would require 
Greenwood to open other trucking routes to Martin.463  Indeed, Zerger & 
Mauer’s current arguments targeting Martin’s allegedly tortious use of 
Second Avenue contradicted a material term in the settlement agreement 
between Greenwood and Martin because Greenwood wanted to reserve 
Second Avenue as the exclusive route for truck traffic.464  As the Eighth 
Circuit succinctly stated, “Greenwood may demand that its former counsel 
not advocate positions that pose the serious threat of once again embroiling 
Greenwood in protracted litigation.”465 
In summary, whether a representation is materially adverse to a former 
client depends on a case-specific inquiry which evaluates the degree to 
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which the lawyer’s current representation may harm the former client.466  
The rub is whether the lawyer’s current representation will cause legal, 
financial, or other identifiable detriment to the former client.467  The mere 
fact that the current client and the former client have competing economic 
interests, however, will not suffice.468 
V. ISSUE OR POSITIONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Finally, environmental lawyers must be prepared to navigate issue or 
positional conflicts of interest.  For example: 
[O]ne client might wish to retain a lawyer to seek a ruling that a 
substance should not be listed as a hazardous substance in a particular 
category under the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 
The lawyer he wishes to hire once worked for EPA and was involved in 
drafting an agency guidance document that classified waste as within the 
category of RCRA hazardous waste.  Or, similarly, another client may 
instruct the lawyer to argue that the substance is a hazardous waste and 
should be listed under RCRA.469 
It is true, of course, that lawyers may advocate any viable 
interpretation of the law to benefit a client on day one, and on day two 
represent another client and promote whatever non-frivolous position 
exists to benefit that client.470  The ability to advocate different and even 
competing positions in different matters is lawyers’ stock-in-trade.  
Advocating opposite sides of the same issue on behalf of two current 
clients in unrelated matters, however, is the archetypal example of an issue 
or positional conflict of interest. 
It is not “inherently improper” for a lawyer to simultaneously take 
inconsistent positions on behalf of different clients in different matters.471  
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Otherwise, lawyers would be forced to specialize on one side of legal 
issues.472  The facts and circumstances of a representation, however, may 
present a conflict severe enough to undermine a lawyer’s credibility, and 
therefore impair the lawyer’s ability to represent both clients.473  Plus, a 
successful outcome for one client may prejudice the other client, which, in 
turn, will likely jeopardize the attorney-client relationship, the quality of 
the representation, or both.474 
Issue or positional conflicts of interest arise in litigation when a lawyer 
argues for an interpretation of the law on behalf of one client that is 
contrary to another client’s interests.  ABA Formal Opinion 93-377475 is a 
good starting point for understanding issue and positional conflicts in this 
context.  In Formal Opinion 93-377, the ABA’s Standing Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility reasoned that if a law firm litigates 
two cases on behalf of different clients in the same jurisdiction, and there 
is a substantial risk that the firm’s representation of one client will create 
a legal precedent, even if not binding, which is likely to materially 
undercut the firm’s legal position on behalf of the other client, a material 
limitation conflict exists under Model Rule 1.7(a)(2).476  Williams v. 
State477 illustrates the quintessential positional conflict of interest where 
divergent legal positions are presented to the same court, albeit in a 
criminal matter rather than in an environmental law context. 
Bernard O’Donnell defended Joseph Williams on first-degree murder 
charges.478  Following Williams’ conviction and death sentence, 
O’Donnell moved to withdraw and requested the appointment of substitute 
counsel for Williams’ appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.479  In so 
moving, O’Donnell reasoned that Williams could argue on appeal that the 
trial court erred in affording “‘great weight’ to the jury’s 10-2 
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recommendation in favor of the death penalty,” and “that he may have a 
conflict in presenting this argument.”480  Specifically, O’Donnell 
explained that he had urged a contrary position on behalf of another capital 
murder defendant in a pending Delaware Supreme Court appeal: in the 
second case he asserted that the trial court erred “when it failed to give 
great weight to the jury’s 2-10 vote rejecting the imposition of the death 
penalty.”481  Based on these clearly divergent positions, O’Donnell 
worried “that his representation of both clients” would risk creating 
“unfavorable precedent . . . for one client or the other,” and invite 
questions as to his overall credibility and perceived loyalty to each 
client.482 
In determining whether a positional conflict required O’Donnell’s 
disqualification, the Delaware Supreme Court articulated the governing 
standard as follows: 
[T]he question is whether the lawyer can effectively argue both sides of 
the same legal question without compromising the interests of one client 
or the other. The lawyer must attempt to strike a balance between the 
duty to advocate any viable interpretation of the law for one client’s 
benefit versus the other client’s right to insist on counsel’s fidelity to 
their legal position.483 
Applying this benchmark, the Williams court agreed that O’Donnell 
had identified a disqualifying positional conflict of interest.484  Indeed, the 
court held that O’Donnell would violate Delaware’s version of Rule 1.7 if 
he advocated conflicting legal positions in two capital murder appeals 
pending simultaneously before the court.485 
Williams displays positional conflicts in litigation at their most 
extreme: (1) setting legal precedent in favor of one client, but adverse to 
another client; and (2) eroding a lawyer’s credibility with the court by 
advocating opposing sides of the same legal issue.  Even when the cases 
are in different jurisdictions, however, a lawyer urging opposite sides of a 
legal issue must still evaluate whether the representation of either client 
will materially limit the lawyer’s effectiveness in the other matter.486  In 
that situation, the risk of an issue or positional conflict is particularly acute 
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where the arguments involve a new or emerging area of the law and the 
first-decided case will likely be regarded as persuasive authority by a court 
in another jurisdiction.487 
In the lobbying context, issue or positional conflicts may surface 
where a law firm argues for a change in the law on behalf of one client that 
will detrimentally affect another current client who is lobbying, litigating, 
or promoting a position that is adverse to the first client’s position.488  
Positional conflicts in lobbying, like their litigation counterparts, require a 
lawyer to navigate potential credibility issues before legislative bodies, 
breaches of confidentiality through the use or disclosure of client 
confidences to advance another client’s interests, and clients’ expected 
loyalty to their cause.489  The District of Columbia, as a focal point for 
lobbying activities in the United States, has implemented its own set of 
conflicts rules for legislative lobbying engagements.490 
Three questions serve as a guidepost for determining whether an issue 
or positional conflict exists in the litigation or lobbying arenas.  First, is 
the issue critically important to both representations?  Second, will the 
determination of the issue in one representation affect its determination in 
the other representation?  Third, will the competing interests materially 
limit the lawyer’s representation of one or both clients?  Unfortunately, 
issue or positional conflicts of interest are difficult to identify because they 
will often elude conflict-checking procedures targeting categories of 
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information such as names of parties and other key players to a new 
matter.491  As a result, these conflicts may remain unnoticed unless raised 
by the lawyers involved, or worse, discovered by the affected clients.  On 
a positive note, this type of material limitation conflict generally is capable 
of consent under Model Rule 1.7(b).492  Thus, where an issue or positional 
conflict is brought to the lawyer’s attention amidst competing matters, the 
lawyer should be able to seek the clients’ consent to proceed with the 
representations.493 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Conflicts of interest affect all lawyers, regardless of practice area, but 
they often are an especially difficult challenge for environmental lawyers.  
Environmental lawyers must be sensitive to both concurrent and former 
client conflicts of interest, recognize them in a timely fashion, evaluate 
whether they may be cured by client consent, and then if they wish to go 
forward with the representation, obtain all affected clients’ informed 
consent to the representation and confirm it in writing.  This is often easier 
said than done.  By tackling the core concepts governing concurrent and 
former client representations under Rules 1.7 and 1.9 of the ABA’s Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, this article attempts to shed some 
additional light on the common conflicts issues that environmental 
lawyers regularly confront.  Without a doubt, understanding conflicts of 
interest is the first step toward avoiding them and, if necessary, curing 
them. 
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